Arabic –English Translation of:

The Hard Way

"Hamas in the 10th government of Palestine"

A Complementary Coursework of Professional Translation Diploma

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We would like to deeply thank Dr. Mohammed Al-Haj Ahmed, assistant professor of translation in the Department of English at the Islamic University of Gaza, for his tremendous efforts, great support and fruitful advice during the translation of this book.

We would also like to give thanks to Prof. Yousef Rizzqa, the former Minister of Information who gave us the permission and consent to translate this book.
Introduction

This work is a translation of 21 chapters of "The Hard Way " Hamas in the 10th Palestinian Government, a book written by Prof. Yousif Rizzqa, Hamas former Minister of Information. The book aims to shed light on parts of the Hard way of Palestinian government's experience in 2006 according to the writer's point of view. The book basically shows the obstacles which Hamas movement faced after taking over the Palestinian government. The book also unveiled the irresponsible acts and plots directed against Hamas leaders and governments from inside and outside even though Hamas took over the government after its sweeping victory in the 2006 general elections.

The motive to choose this book was to enrich our knowledge about historical events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the causes of the internal division. In addition, the researchers, Palestinian people living in Gaza and suffering from the division results, decided to expose the real picture about what happened in the Gazan street as the book discusses several historical and modern Palestinians issues such as the division between Hamas and Fatah, and the Palestinian consensus government. On the other hand, the writer shows many Arab initiatives, regional and international positions on the Palestinian crises.

This book is enriched with much information, details, and deep criticism to the development of events through Hamas political participation. It was obvious that Hamas experience was full of difficulties as it faced many challenges inside and the outside Palestine. One of the main challenges Hamas faced was the imposing of the siege on Gaza strip which has been crippling the coastal enclave for more than seven years .
The Purpose

Hamas political experience is unique and difficult. It was full of obstacles and financial and political siege. The government of Hamas suffered from internal conflict with Fatah movement as well as many attempts to undermine and topple the government despite the tremendous efforts by the movement to make change in the life of people at political, economic, and social fronts.

Hamas has many enemies from inside and outside, who collaborate to undermine its government. This project aims to show unfamiliar information which may be shocking to some people. The writer tried to mention an obvious historical sequence to the stages and the elements of the eternal Palestinian – Israeli conflict, the most difficult obstacle Hamas faced as government as the conflict strengthened the internal Palestinian division.

Every Palestinian has a right to know real information and facts which give him explanation to what happened on the ground and the real position of Hamas as a government, their attempts to develop the country and the obstacles and plots Hamas faced.

One day the history will remember this period when Hamas took over the government and strength and weakness points; history will tell the generations to come about who Hamas is, what they tried to do, and how the world dealt with them. It's obvious that Hamas is not a perfect movement and they had many mistakes in their governing period but we have to admit that they did not have the sufficient time to govern.
Methodology

1) Searching for a political book to translate.
2) Getting the permission from Prof. Yousf Rezqa.
3) Contacting the administration of Community Development Institute to get the approval for our chosen material.
4) Contacting Dr. Mohammed El Haj Ahmed to be our supervisor and obtaining his approval.
5) Handing a copy of the book to the supervisor.
6) Handing a copy of the book to the administration.
7) Starting to translate the book page by page.
8) Contacting the supervisor for feedback on the translation correcting the mistakes reported.
9) Editing the final copy.
10) Writing the theoretical part of the project.
11) Editing the theoretical part
12) Submitting.

The Target Group

- The western society.
- People who are interested in Palestinian issues, especially the internal conflict between Hamas and Fatah.
- Students who are studying media, history or any related subjects.
Difficulties
The researchers have met a number of difficulties. Here are some of these problems:

1) The language of the writer is very difficult as it is also full of several figures of speech, and political terms which are difficult to translate.

For example,

٠صت اٌض٠ذ ػٍٝ إٌبس, اٌعفخ فٟ ٚاد ٚ غضح فٟ ٚاد آخش, اٌخطبة اٌّ أفْٛ , اٌذٚي اٌّبسلخ

2) Many sentences are very long and needed to be broken down to be easily translated.

3) Unfamiliarity with the historical background as the documents involve names of organizations, events, initiatives, and some Palestinian leaders.

4) Some words and expressions have no equivalent in the target language.

Techniques to face the difficulties:
The researchers have used the following techniques to deal with these problems, as shown below:

1) Adaptation:
Something specific to the source language culture is expressed in a totally different way that is familiar or appropriate to the target language culture.

For example, translating some verses of the Holy Quraan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Text</th>
<th>Target Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;و اعتصموا بحبيل الله جمُعا و لا تفرقوا&quot;</td>
<td>And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: Here in this verse, we concentrate on conveying the meaning of the verse while translating it into the target language.

2) Avoiding literal translation: we did our best to avoid translation word by word because this way of translation will make the meaning ambiguous. For example,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Text</th>
<th>Target Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>هذه الخطاب المبوموء الذي تلدُه بكيل الاتهامات الباطلة للقيادات الوطنية الفلسطينية</td>
<td>This bad speech contains accusations to the Palestinian national leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>و كتبته عن الخطاب و تداعياته و أسبابه أفلام صحفية عديدة منها منصف و بعضها يصب الزيت على النار.</td>
<td>And many journalists have written about the speech, its consequences and causes; some of these articles were biased but the other were unbiased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source text</td>
<td>Target Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>اشذذل الاعذذمو انمحهذذٍ و الاقهُمذذٍ و انعذذانمٍ مذذ  انفهساُىُط نحماس.</td>
<td>There was huge coverage of the news in local, regional, and international media. The news was shocking the Hamas government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) **Borrowing and transliteration**:  
Borrowing is the taking of words directly from one language into another without translation. For Example, **Hamas, Fatah, Al Nakba**.

Those words are famous affiliations and events that need not to be translated literally.

4) **Breaking down the source text into parts to easily translate it into the target language**.

In translating this project, we came across several, long sentences that should be broken into translatable chunks in order to provide a clear meaning for the TL reader, as seen in the following example:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source text</th>
<th>Target text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>وقع تصريح ناصر الشاعر برداً على التيار الاقليبي</td>
<td><strong>Al-Shaer's statement</strong> was warmly received by the Fatah rejectionists as it was the first time for a minister and a deputy minister to ignore the statements made by the head of the Hamas political bureau, particularly in issues pertaining to the government. Indeed neither Dr.Naser nor the government got any benefit from criticizing Meshaal's opinions. <strong>This, however</strong>, enhanced the position of the rejectionists as they found their refuge in Al Shaer's statement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>فإنه للمرة الأولى ينزع وزير، بل نائب رئيس الوزراء،</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الغطاء عن خالد مشعل رئيس المكتب السياسي في</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>المسائل التي تتعلق بالحكومة. بالطبع لم يحصل</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الدكتور ناصر الشاعر ولا الحكومة على منفعة واحدة</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>من وراء كشف الغطاء عن رئيس المكتب السياسي،</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بل عزز من عربدة التيار الاقليبي على قاعدة (</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وشهد شاهد من أهلها).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comment:** Here, we divided the source text into several sentences using commas and transitional markers to make the meaning clearer for the TL reader.
Conclusion

Translating this type of books is a challenging experience for us but at the same time it is fruitful and useful. By doing so the researchers have gained many benefits either at the personal or political levels as they became more aware of what is happening around them. They also enriched their knowledge with varied political terms, events, plots, and initiatives.

In April, 2014 Hamas and Fatah signed a new reconciliation agreement to form a national consensus government, but until this moment, we have not seen any positive results out this new deal. Thus, we hope that the two parties will reach a genuine agreement which will pave the way to solving all existing disagreements.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Mohammed Al Haj Ahmed for his great efforts in supervising and leading us to achieve this humble project.
Document No. (1)
In the name of Allah, the Entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful (And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided)
National Coalition Government Program
With recognition to the precious blood of martyrs, prisoners and the wounded, sacrifices of our Palestinian people, the protection of their rights; to maintain national constants and national unity, to build Palestinian home; and to perform constitutional duties assigned to the government according to the bylaw; to achieve the principle of participation and democracy by protecting the rights and interests of the Palestinian people; and to support the steadfastness of people and achieve their national rights by removing the occupation, and in protection of the Right of Return, resistance, building a fully independent sovereign State with Jerusalem as its capital, the government program is outlined as follows:
1. Working to remove the occupation, settlements, the Apartheid Wall, and working to build a fully sovereign Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital; supporting the steadfastness of people, rejecting partial solutions, and the policy of fait accompli, and any project diminishing our rights.

2. Sticking to the Right of Return of Palestinian refugees to their homes and properties as an individual, public and non-transferable right.

3. Striving to release prisoners, facing the Israeli practices on the ground such as assassinations, arrests and incursions (particularly the Judaization of Jerusalem, annexation of the rifts, expansion of settlements, fragmentation of the West Bank, the Apartheid Wall, and all resulting practices through the activation of the resolution of the International Court of Justice in the Hague); facing collective punishments, rejecting blackmailing and confiscating of tax revenues.

1. العمل على إزالة الاحتلال، والمستوطنات، وشدد جدار الفصل العنصري، والعمل على بناء الدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة كاملة السيادة وعاصمتها القدس ودعم صمود أهلها، ورفض الحلول الجزئية، وسياسة الأمر الواقع، وكل مشروع يتنقص حقوقنا.

2. التمسك بحق عودة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين إلى ديارهم وممتلكاتهم باعتباره حقا فرديا وعاما، غير قابل للتنازل عنه.

3. العمل على تحرير الأسري، ومواجهة إجراءات الاحتلال على الأرض من اغتيالات واعتقالات واجتياحات (وبالذات تهويد القدس، وضم الأغوار، وتوسيع المستوطنات، وتمزيق الضفة، وجدار الفصل العنصري، وما نتج عنه من ممارسات من خلال تفعيل قرار محكمة العدل الدولية في لاهاي بشأنه)، ومواجهة العقوبات الجماعية، ورفض الابتزاز الاغتصاب لمستحقات السلطة.
4. Resistance with all its forms is a legitimate right for the Palestinian people to end the occupation and restore their national rights.

5. Working with the international community to remove the occupation, settlements, the Wall and the complete withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem; and the implementation of the Right of Return, releasing of prisoners and detainees, in order to restore calm and stability in the region at this moment.

6. Carrying out a revolutionary reform of the domestic situation, combating corruption, solving the problem of unemployment, building the society's institutions on democratic basis that secure justice, equality, participation, practice of political pluralism, enforcing law, separation of powers, independence and integrity of the judiciary, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
7. Building our national institutions on national, professional and democracy basis, away from exclusivity and political affiliations.

8. The government abides by what has been agreed upon between the Palestinian factions in Cairo in March 2005 regarding the rebuilding and activation of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on democratic foundations that secure the full participation of Palestinian spectrum, calling for the immediate carrying out of necessary measures.

9. The Government will deal with high responsibility with the signed agreements and in accordance with the interests of our people and the protection of their rights and constants.

10. The government deals with international resolutions relevant to the national responsibility to protect the rights of our people.

11. Maintaining and protecting the autonomy of the Palestinian national decision.
12. Emphasizing our Arabic and Islamic roots and activating the support of Arabic and Islamic countries to our people and Palestinian cause in all fields.

13. Maintaining good, friendly and balanced relations based on mutual respect with Arabic, Islamic and various countries and international institutions.

14. Working to create free passage between towns and villages in the West Bank, between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and opening the crossings with Egypt and Jordan permanently, building the Gaza port and running the airport.

15. Protecting democracy and promoting peaceful transfer of power.

16. Carrying out municipal elections on democratic bases.

17. Supporting the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, and resisting the policy of Judaization.

18. Enforcing the integrity of law.
19. Providing security for citizens, the nation, the public and private properties.

20. Reforming the judiciary, its independence and impartiality and improving its efficiency and decisions.

21. Protecting public and private freedoms, freedom of expressions, party formations, and outlawing political detention.

22. Protecting the glue of civil society, developing its institutions, bolstering national unity, combating corruption and malpractices, tackling security chaos.

23. Developing administrative and financial reforms, reinforcing the role of oversight, setting up the Complaints Committee, enforcing anti-graft and corruption laws, and mishandling of public money, giving equal opportunities for all, outlawing job exclusion for partisan or political reasons.

24. Building the capacity of martyrs- supporting institutions, the wounded, and Prisoner Movement.

26. Protecting the rights of the vulnerable and the poor, looking after the rights of people with special needs and supporting rehabilitation institutions.

27. Improving the living conditions of citizens, promoting social solidarity, expanding security net and social, medical and educational protection, and improving the provision of services.

28. Preparing a comprehensive national plan designed to improve human development at all levels.

29. Protecting the rights of women, children, youth, and family and reinforcing the role played by each of them in development.

30. Reinforcing the role of youth, supporting their institutions and expanding youth involvement in development.

31. Setting up a comprehensive national plan to combat poverty, unemployment and deal with the problems of workers and graduates.
32. Developing the housing sector and providing houses for young and poor couples.

33. Reinforcing the role of education, higher education and developing education institutions, improving efficiency and quality, promoting scientific research and research outcomes, caring for graduates, vocational and applied learning.

34. Upgrading health utilities, public and specialist services, improving professional performance, increasing cooperation with the countries of the region, international institutions, and achieving self-sufficiency.

35. Developing agriculture, livestock and marine sectors and encouraging export and food manufacturing.

36. Building investment-based institutions that raise growth rates, preventing monopoly and exploitation, protecting workers, promoting industrialization and export, increasing and developing trade with Arab and international world, with the aim of serving
Palestinian interests and enhancing their capabilities in addition to the enacting of relevant laws.

37. Enhancing the role of cultural institutions and taking care of Palestinian and Arab heritage and protecting people against cultural invasion.

38. Enhancing the independent role of media institutions and protecting the rights and freedom of press, journalists and facilitating their work.

39. Supporting and activating of the role of unions at professional and public levels.

40. Building Communication bridges with all members of the Palestinian spectrum and activating their role in servicing national issues.

41. "Our Lord, let not our hearts deviate after You have guided us and grant us from Yourself mercy. Indeed, You are the Bestower"

Great truth of God.
Document number (2)
Letter of designation to form government
21/2/2006

The letter of designation was the first confrontation between the president and the prime minister-designate as the president included an item not usually included in his speeches to previous governments.

The president deliberately used this controversial statement "I invite you, as the head of the next government, to abide by the highest interests of the Palestinian people, preserve and develop their achievements, work to achieve their national objectives as established by the independence Declaration, National councils decisions, bylaw articles, Arab summits decisions, and commitments made in my last speech before the Legislative Council on Saturday 18/2/2006."
In this statement the president confirmed his utmost authority. It also showed his political vision which adopts negotiations with Israel as a strategic choice, and his commitments to the Oslo accords, the independence document, and Arab summit decisions, (Arab Initiative for Peace). Given Hamas' position of these agreements, the president wanted to deliver a message to Hamas that winning the parliamentary election does not mean the end of the road, but the beginning of a new path: (either to encounter the challenges or to abide by the signed agreements). What was mentioned in the Letter of Designation was an evidence of the failure in the negotiations and the countdown to form a national unity government due to the discrepancies in opinions.

In its reaction to the Letter of designation, the Hamas leadership had two different opinions. The first was to accept the designation and refuse the paragraphs of the speech, particularly the third paragraph, while replacing it by a direct statement with full responsibilities of consequences. The second opinion was to accept the designation regardless of context, as the speech, particularly the third paragraph, contained positive and negative points. This means that there is no need to start a crisis, so the answer was the following:
Mr. President Abu Mazen, Esquire.
Chairman of Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The President of the Palestinian national authority.

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings

I Respectfully received the oration of authorization to form the Palestinian government, and I am pleased to emphasize the following:

1. thank you for your trust, and we wish to be good beginning to our people and our cause.

2. we will take notice to complete the formation of the Government and presented to you for consultation and approval in the period defined by the basic law.

3. the Government will start their work according to the highest interests of the Palestinian people, the Government will deal by high responsibility with signed agreements based on the supreme interests of the Palestinian people, which does not detract from the Palestinian national rights, and does not affect their principles.

4. the Government will try to ensure the government's role in protecting the security of the Palestinian people, and to enhance the political and civil liberties, and to ensure the participation of all the Palestinian people in the government's work.
4. the Government will keen to safeguard national unity, promote the national talk, strengthen political pluralism and peaceful rotation of power, protect human rights and public freedoms, the power of law and the independence of the judiciary, integrity in the management of public funds, encouraging the private sector, started the Desired reform, that enhance the people Steadfastness and its ability to face challenges.

5. The government will work to communicate with the Arab and Islamic world and openness to the regional and international level so as to maintain our cause justness and its Orient human aspect.

6. In conclusion, I am pleased to express our pride in our Palestinian people and its democratic Parliament experience that reflected in the legislative elections, While your careful position have a positive impact on its conducting.
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"
في هذا البناء يؤكد الرئيس على حضوره الشخصي وصلاحياته من ناحية، وعلى رؤيته السياسية التي تعتمد المفاوضات مع إسرائيل خيارا استراتيجيا، وعلى التزاماته بموجب اتفاقية أوسلو وجهاتها من ناحية ثانية إضافة إلى وثيقة الاستقلال، وقرارات القسم العربي، (وينص هذه المبادرة العربية )، من ناحية ثالثة، وهو يعلم موقف حماس من هذه الاتفاقين ومضامينها مسبقاً، ولكنه أراد أن يقول لحماس إن فوزكم في الانتخابات لا يمثل نهاية المطاف كما قد تحسون، وإنما هو بداية طريق جديد: (إما متاعب وإما المتابعة المتدرجة لما وقعت عليه منظمة التحرير )، إن كل ما ورد في خطاب التكليف كان هو مضامن المفاوضات الفاشلة لإقامة حكومة وحدة وطنية بسبب تباين المواقف فيها.

In this statement the president confirmed his utmost authority. It also showed his political vision which adopts negotiations with Israel as a strategic choice, and his commitments to the Oslo accords, the independence document, and Arab summit decisions, (Arab Initiative for Peace). Given Hamas' position of these agreements, the president wanted to deliver a message to Hamas that winning the parliamentary election does not mean the end of the road, but the beginning of a new path: (either to encounter the challenges or to abide by the signed agreements). What was mentioned in the Letter of Designation was an evidence of the failure in the negotiations and the countdown to form a national unity government due to the discrepancies in opinions.

توقف قيادة حماس عند خطاب التكليف عند رأيين، أحدهما يطالب بالقبول التكليف ورفض مضامن الخطاب في بند الثالث بذكاء صريح مع تحمل النتائج، والأخر يقبل التكليف، ويقفز عن المضمون لأن في البند الثالث عبارات مفروضة إلى جانب تلك المرفوعة، ولا داع لأن نبدأ بأزمة فكان الرد التالي:

In its reaction to the Letter of designation, the Hamas leadership had two different opinions. The first was to accept the designation and refuse the paragraphs of the speech, particularly the third paragraph, while replacing it by a direct statement with full responsibilities of consequences. The second opinion was to accept the designation regardless of context, as the speech, particularly the third paragraph, contained positive and negative points. This means that there is no need to start a crisis, so the answer was the following:
The Cairo Declaration

Under the patronage of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Palestinian Conference for Dialogue was held in Cairo on 15-17-3-2005. The conference was attended by President Mahmoud Abbas and twelve factions and groups.

The participants showed commitment to the Palestinian national constants, and the right of the Palestinian people in resistance in order to end the occupation and establish a fully independent sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. They also call for the return of refugees to their homes.

The participants agreed to the 2005 program calling for full commitment to the non-continuation of attacks in return Israel stopped all kinds of aggression on land and people. It also involved the release of all prisoners and detainees.
The participants confirmed that the continuous building of settlements, building the wall and the Judaization of East Jerusalem are destabilizing factors. They discussed the internal situation as they agreed on the necessity to complete reforms in all fields and support all aspects of the democratic process. They also called for the holding of local and legislative elections on specified time according to an electoral law to be agreed upon.

The conference recommended the Legislative Council take procedures to amend the legislative electoral law through the adoption of electoral mixed system. It also recommended amending the local councils electoral law through the adoption of proportional representation.

The participants agreed to activate the role of the PLO according to criteria agreed upon by all parties. This involved the inclusion of all Palestinian forces and factions as the sole legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. A committee responsible for selecting these criteria has been agreed upon.
The Committee consists of the President of the National Council, Executive Committee members, Secretaries of all Palestinian factions and independent national figures. The Chairman of the Executive Committee call for meetings.

The participants unanimously agreed that dialogue is the only way to deal with all factions as it supports the Palestinian national unity. They also prohibited the use of weapons to solve disputes and called for the respect of the entire rights of the Palestinian citizens. The participants considered the dialogue a necessity due to the role it plays in the maintenance of Palestinian rights.

The Cairo Declaration on 17/3/2005 was a step in uniting the Palestinian efforts and an agreement on a set of principles and national tasks. These tasks included the cease of attacks by the Palestinian side in return of Israel's commitment to stop aggression; the holding of legislative election by adopting electoral mixed system (relative Constituencies and lists), and
amendment of the municipal elections on the basis of (proportional representation). It also involved the activation and development of the PLO and the setting up of a mechanism of meetings, invitations and attendance including the president’s role of the call for invitations. President Mahmoud Abbas is the head of the Executive Committee.

The Cairo Declaration aimed to respond to the views of all the parties participated, and it served well at Palestinian and Arab levels. Days later have proved that the concluding statements of conferences were used as a maneuver used by the strongest party to achieve the interests of all parties without exception. However, in reality, the strong party was selective in implementation. This confirmed that the dialogue was to secure a truce.

What was implemented out of the many objectives of the Cairo Declaration (e.g. satisfaction the needs of for every party) was the truce, but the decision of carrying out reforms at the Palestinian Liberation Organization has not been done, (I do not think that local, regional
and international situation is appropriate to carry out such reform). I do not think either that there is total conviction and willingness to confront this situation nor to respond to the Palestinian internal needs.
The Arab peace initiative was one of the results of the Summit held in Beirut on 27 March 2002. The summit communiqué issued on 28 February 2002 included:

- The Council asks Israel to reconsider its policy towards peace, declaring that a just peace is its strategic choice. The Council also asked Israel to do the following:
  - To fully withdraw from the occupied Arab lands to the pre-1967 war borders, including the Syrian Golan Heights and the lands that it occupies in southern Lebanon.
  - To reach a just, agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, in accordance with UN Resolution 194.
  - To accept an independent, sovereign Palestinian state on the lands occupied in 1967 including the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.
* In return the Arab countries will do the following:

- To declare that the Arab-Israeli conflict is over, and be ready to sign a peace agreement with Israel including the provision of security to all countries of the region.
- Building normal ties with Israel based on a comprehensive peace.
- Refusing all forms of Palestinian re-settlement incompatible with the special situation in hosting Arab countries.

The council calls the Israel government and all Israelis to accept this initiative described above, as it will protect peace opportunities and prevent bloodshed, thus allowing Arab countries and Israel to live in peace side by side and providing generations to come a safe, prosperous future.
After the summit the Saudi initiative became (the Arab initiative for Peace). (See the Saudi initiative to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, Jawed Al-Hamad, Director of the Middle East Studies Center – Jordan-July 2003)

The initiative include the following main points:
- Israel withdraws from all Arab territories occupied in 1967,
- To establish a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital including the return of the refugees.
- In return the Arabs normalize relations with Israel.

Unlike the previous initiatives this initiative includes:
- The initiative is particularly directed to the Israeli people similar to the visit made by President Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977 and his talk in the Knesset.
- The Arabs shall undertake to recognize Israel and normalize relations with it, something never been tackled in previous international resolutions nor been discussed in any Arab summit.
- The intention of Saudi Arabia to recognize Israel, and its new policy of being directly involved in the peace process as a partner
instead of its previous attitude of being reserved on the results of the peace process, waiting for its final results.

- The offering of a simultaneous recognition of Israel by the 22 Arab countries in return for the Israeli withdrawal from the Arab lands. Issues of disputes are not necessarily to be discussed sequentially as was the case in the Madrid conference. This will reduce the pressure on Israel on selecting the issues to be discussed, particularly contention points.

- The initiative has shifted the responsibility of determining the final status of the Arab – Israeli conflict and peace with it from the PLO, which has been practicing this role since it was recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1974, and the end of the Palestinian-Jordanian dispute over this issue. This newly emerging role has enabled Israel to curb the role played by the Palestinian side and their ability to be involved in long – term confrontations with the Israeli side which in turn had disastrous impacts on its economy and stability.
The official Palestinian position:
The official Palestinian position represented by the Palestinian Authority leadership, and successive Governments excluding the Hamas government have shown their support. This may also involve the PLO factions. Hamas however has rejected the initiative from the beginning considering it prejudicial to the Palestinian rights and their uprising, for many reasons. For more information about these reasons the reader can consult full academic studies about the initiative.(See Middle East Studies Center/)

Since the Hanniya government took over the rule, the Arabs, particularly Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the PNA asked the government to show their support to the Arab initiative. This was clearly seen during the closed meetings...
including Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahar, PM Ismail Haniyeh and several Arab ministers. In one meeting the Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa addressed the government: How do you ask for the Arab assistance?, and the support of the Arab league while you are refusing what Arabs have unanimously adopted at the Beirut Summit in 2002? The Arabs keep asking the government to accept the initiative with reservation.

The government in turn does not try to respond to the Arab demands as the government has no problem with what the Arabs have agreed on, but Israel rejects the initiative and its response seen when it invaded the West Bank. It was not also appropriate after five years of the initiative to offer something free without any return.
The road map

The objective of the road map is to find a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented by President Bush in his speech on 24 June. The initiative was welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the Ministerial statements issued by the Quartet on 16 July and 17 September.

A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours. The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties.

This settlement also will take into consideration the importance of the Saudi initiative adopted by the Arab Summit in Beirut. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.
acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below.

The Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions between the parties as required.

The plan establishes a realistic timeline for implementation. Progress will require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases may come sooner than indicated.

The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties' performance on implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.

Phase I: Ending terror and violence, normalising Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions (present to May 2003)

In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps outlined below. Palestinians and Israelis resume security co-operation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services.

Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open
elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalise Palestinian life.

Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied after September 28, 2000, and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and co-operation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.

At the outset of Phase I:

- Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.

- Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement confirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.

GOI (Government of Israel) takes no actions in undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure.
Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere. Palestinian Authority security apparatuses begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantling of terrorist infrastructure.

Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on the establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.

Implementation, as previously agreed, of US rebuilding, training and resumed security co-operation plan in collaboration with external oversight board (US-Egypt-Jordan). Quartet support efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive ceasefire.

- All Palestinian security apparatuses are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
- Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security co-operation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of US security officials.

Security

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Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.

All donors providing financial support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance’s Single Treasury Account.

As security performance improves, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since 28 September 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to 28 September 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

Palestinian institution-building

Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as possible, a constitutional committee circulates a draft Palestinian constitution, based on robust parliamentary and democracy principles and a cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate. The constitutional committee proposes a draft document for submission after elections to be approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions.

The Appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. Completion of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.

Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-making body.
Establishment of an independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.

Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.

As early as possible, (USA demand to add clues :and based upon the above measures) Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections.

GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate in accordance with prior agreements between the parties.

**Humanitarian response**

Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. This includes the full implementation of the recommendations of the Bertini report aimed to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unlimited access of international and humanitarian personnel.

GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.

Civil society

Continued donor support, for people to people programs, and civil society initiatives.
Settlements

- GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.
- Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).

Phase II: transitional (June 2003-December 2003)

In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account the performance of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalise Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions. Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003.

Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security co-operation, continued normalisation of Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
**International conference:** The conference, convened by the Quartet in consultation with the parties, immediately after the successful implementation of Palestinian elections, aims to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process, leading to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.

Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles described in the preamble to this document. Arab states restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).

- Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues.

- New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalised and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution.

- Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally established, consistent with draft constitution.

- Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.

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members of the Quartet are moving toward international recognition of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, including possible United Nations membership.

- Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
- Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet.
- Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible UN membership.

Phase III: Permanent status agreement and end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2004-2005)

Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring.

Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilisation of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.

Second international conference: Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a
Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide.

Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
There have been local and international attempts to overthrow the tenth Palestinian government led by Hamas before the cabinet took over their responsibilities, according to Dr. Bashir Musa NAFI's article issued in the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper on 20/4/2006. These attempts aimed to prevent the government complete more than two or three months of its electoral and constitutional mandate. Here, we would highlight the American dominant position in order to inform the reader, and learn lessons.

On 14/2/2006 The New York Times published what it called the strategy used by the Bush administration and Israel to overthrow the Hamas government. After overthrowing the government, there would be calls for elections in which Fatah candidates were expected to win and form a new Government. Abington says the "Israeli-US joint strategy" is to prevent the Hamas Government from getting the funds it needs (starving it), so that it cannot perform its functions and duties.

Abington suggests questions about whether the American and Israeli administrations are trying to topple Hamas without producing this chaos or suffering from the Palestinian people, and is there a possibility for their return to power? The result of this is that Hamas may accept it and endure such a result, and the Palestinian people?!
Abington is wondering: Can the US administration and Israel overthrow Hamas without creating chaos or causing substantial damage to the Palestinian people, and is there a possibility to reconstruct the Fatah movement so that it can form the government? Such a plan presupposes that Hamas as well as the Palestinian people can accept and comply to this scenario,?!  

The Bush administration tried to deny the report, but the facts on the ground confirmed Abingdon's report. This includes:

1. To deal with the Hamas government the American administration stipulated that the government should recognize the right of Israel to exist, renounce violence, disarm, and abide by previous agreements.

2. After announcing these conditions the US officials refused to consider the announcement as a true peace process. This was contrary to what former President Arafat did in 1993 when he gave assurances in a letter to Rabin, including the aids of donor countries and a true peace process. Now after 11 years, only the aids of donor countries is the only available option in return for these assurances.

3. The Bush Administration has changed its policy on giving aids to the Palestinian people. The aids will no longer be used for developmental projects, but will only be given for humanitarian purpose (food and medicine and stuff like that).
4. The administration and the Agency for International Development (USAID) urged the Palestinian authority to return back to the US government the non-used money of the $50 million aid provided to President Abbas during his visit to Washington on May 2005 (it has already repaid).

5. Officials in the Bush administration have told us that they oppose any attempts by the Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar to meet the deficit resulting due to the US suspension of aids to Palestinian Authority.

6. Senior officials said that the US National Security Council supports Olmert's decision to stop transferring Palestinian tax revenues collected by Israel as this will significantly affect the ability of Palestinian Authority to pay the salaries of its employees.

7. American officials said they will work hard to isolate the Hamas government, and the US Administration will not deal with any member from the Hamas–led government, including non-Hamas members.

8. According to sources in Washington, some Fatah senior officials have encouraged the Bush Administration to overthrow the Hamas–led government.
9. Abrams, Deputy of American National Security Advisor, and Daid Walsh, Assistant US Secretary of State will visit Jerusalem and Ramallah in the following week for consultations with Israeli and Palestinian officials. We have been told that the visit aimed to make sure there is no misunderstanding among Palestinian officials regarding the US use of a tough policy toward Hamas.

Abingdon’s Comment:
Abingdon believes that the Bush administration’s plan may not succeed in forcing Hamas to leave the government. The economic sanctions against the Palestinian people can have serious consequences, and Palestinian people will think that Washington and Israel were refusing to accept the 25 January elections, and that both the USA and Isarel were working to undermine the elected government, simply because they did not like it. I think the facts on the ground since February 2006 until February 2007 proved what was mentioned in Abingdon’s document. The government and the people are suffering, while some are awaiting the toppling of the government.
Elliot Abrams: plan
(Alastair Crooke) director and founder of the Conflicts Forum, with colleague (Mark Berry), director of the USA Forum of Conflicts, published a plan by the US undersecretary of National Security, Elliott Abrams. The plan, called "hard coup", states, according to Abrams, that the USA was not only refusing to deal with Hamas, but also trying to topple it. Following the Hamas victory in the elections held on 25 January 2006, Abrams invited to the White House a group of Palestinian businessmen. The meeting discussed the "hard coup" against the newly elected government and its leaders with the support of the United States. Abrams added: "The United States should provide Fatah with machine guns, ammunition and training so that it can use them against Hamas in an attempt to take over the Palestinian government.

Mark Perry and Alastair Crooke Say: "It is noted that a number of Fatah activists received training in camps held in Ramallah and Jericho. Guns and ammunition were sent to President Mahmood Abbas's office. The weapons came through Egypt and Jordan, and the US Administration appointed some
agents to oversee this program; one of them may be General KET Dayton. (Egypt sent 1900 machine guns, and Jordan sent 3,000, in addition to 3 million rounds. (This figure was later confirmed by Ha'aretz; Egypt and Jordan didn’t deny the news, and the Palestinian citizen saw this new weapons in the hands of Hamas opponents).

Abrair program began in February 2006. A group of White House officials wanted to adopt a tough policy towards Hamas after its victory in the 2006 elections. The group led by Abrams included national security advisers working in the Vice President's office, including David Worsmr, a prominent conservative, as well as John Hanna. This policy was approved by the US Secretary of State. Even the US President approved this policy provided that the programs are supervised by the CIA. The researchers added: "Rice and Abrams and US envoy David Welch suppoted the project. Welch considered the project as part of the US initiative for the Middle East."

In fact, the Pentagon officials believed that Hamas's inability to provide security for its people, and the recent shocks have been a result of the Abrams' plan, though some Israeli officials had a different opinion, according to Ha'aretz newspaper. On 25/12/2006 the paper repoted that a senior Israeli intelligence official had told Olmert that a replacement for Hamas was not possible and its rival, Fatah, was totally disintegated. The official added that there was no prospect that the US programe would succeed in replacing Hamas. Moreover, Israeli intelligence officials have ignored a call for early elections, saying:
"These elections will destroy the Fatah movement. Ha'aretz also reported that the Shin Beth's chief Yuval Diskin " told the Israeli cabinet on 24 December 2006 that if the elections were held in the Palestinian territories, Fatah chances to win were close to zero". 
We previously presented the political and security levels with regard to the US vision aimed at putting an end to the rule of Hamas. In the following we will briefly present the legal status that had an effective role in the blockade. The US congress approved with a large majority a bill aiming to prevent the administration from providing direct or indirect aids to the Palestinian Authority after the Hamas victory.

The bill named "against Palestinian terrorism" has been approved by 361 in favor, 37 against and 9 abstentions. It got the backing of both the Republicans and Democrats in the House of representatives on the same day the Israeli Prime Minister Olmert held talks with the US President George Bush.

Republican Rep. Elena Ros-Lehtinen, who proposed the bill, said that this vote allows us to say clearly: that the United States will not fund a government led by Islamist jihadists (Hamas) and will not allow them to attack innocent people in Israel or elsewhere.

The project aims to consider the authority as "a terrorist haven" and calls for the prohibition of granting visas to any official or member of the Palestinian Authority, or part thereof, and the suspension of part of the US funding to the Palestinian Authority.

Earl Plume yoke the Democratic Rep. of Oregon said that the bill is deterrent to the Palestinians, and it will be a heavy burden to the US diplomatic efforts, adding that the bill will have grave consequences through the strengthening of the fundamentals' grip. Meanwhile, Rep. Tom Lantos said, "We in the Congress are dissatisfied with the
Palestinians' decision of choosing the Hamas government as all things that Hamas represents triggers our resentment."

The project limits direct aids to the Palestinian Central Election Commission, Presidents' office security expenses, and expenses relating to peace negotiations with Israel, with every exceptional case being studied separately. The aids, according to other reports, cover other departments including **the 17th Security Forces**, Palestinian Intelligence Service, Attorney General office, Monetary Authority, Investment Fund, Border Crossing Management, Palestine voice, Palestinian News Agency (Wafa), Palestine TV, and Human Rights Independent Commission, and General Control Institution. These departments belong to Presidents' office.

By these measures the Bush administration has put its plan to overthrow the Hamas Government through three levels: legal, political. The planning and implementing of this plan has been orchestrated by senior National Security Council officials, Foreign Secretary staff, Deputy President Office and neocons, with direct coordination with Israeli leadership.

The US-Israeli plan wasn't secret as most of its details were known to researchers, politicians and journalists, as well as to the government of Ismail Haniya and the Hamas leadership. Palestinian local leaders and Arab regimes are publically dealing with it. This could be related to the power influence enjoyed by Israel and America, and the cultural and ideological violations they practices against some Arab leaders since the Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977. All this gave enough courage for this leadership to talk about their goals aimed at overthrowing the government of Hamas after branding it a 'failure'. This leadership wants the return to the rule of Fata despite the serious consequences that the decision may have on democracy concepts that America is bragging about and the threats of civil war and negative impacts on the Arab region, particularly Egypt and Jordan.
Sadly, Palestinian officials from the President's Office and Fatah movement have responded to the US-Israeli plan by providing assistance at several levels, including theoretical and practical assistance. Palestinians have seen various aspects of this cooperation at political, media, administrative and security levels, which, unfortunately, resulted in casualties and injuries on both sides, and deformed the image of the Palestinian people and their struggle, particularly for those who do not follow up the Palestinian issue closely.

Dr. Bashir Nafi Says: despite the reconciliatory remarks given by President Mahmoud Abbas, it is hard to exempt the President from role in trying to overthrow the new government that disagrees with his point of view regarding the national case.

Al Qudus Al Arabi said, "Some Fatah members blamed the president for the Hamas sweeping victory in the legislative elections". Sources close to him said the president suddenly became concerned with how to respond to this charge. The newspaper described a meeting involving President Mahmoud Abbas, Fatah leaders, and Jordanian political at Abdul Raouf Rawabdeh's house in Amman. (Rawabdeh is known as the fiercest opponent of Hamas in Jordan who gave decision to expel Hamas leaders from Jordan five years ago). It said that many issues were discussed in the meeting and it was clear to those who attended that President Abbas had agenda to get rid of Hamas, an agenda that could be felt in several direction.

The newspaper here referred to the prisoners' document, referendum, Tunisia visit, Kaddome reconciliation, strengthening the grip of some influential members of Fatah and excluding others.

The newspaper here referred to the prisoners' document, referendum, Tunisia visit, Kaddome reconciliation, strengthening the grip of some influential members of Fatah and excluding others.
Palestinian Government cannot be overthrown without Arab complicity, as Dr. Basher NAFI said. In fact foreign intervention in the region, whether in political or military affairs, cannot be achieved without Arab intervention. Examples include the first Gulf war, the Iraq invasion, the siege and the assassination of President Arafat.

The impact of the financial siege on the tenth Palestinian government practiced by the USA, Israel and Europe may not be clear to the sympathetic Arab people, who may have some views they wish Hamas had taken in consideration. Hence a brief show of Palestinian budget revenues.
General financial status of Government

الإيرادات:

Revenue:

1- موارد الجباية (ضرائب السلطة الداخلية في الضفة وغزة = 40% من إجمالي الإيرادات وتساوي بالأرقام (20-30 مليون) دولار، انخفضت بفعل الإضرابات إلى (10 مليون) دولار.

1- collection resources (authority internal tax in West Bank and Gaza = 40% of gross revenue and equal numbers (20–30 million dollars), plummeted by strikes to (10 million US) dollars.

2- موارد المقاصة مع إسرائيل = 60% من الإجمالي، وهذه تساوي (50–55 مليون) دولار شهرياً تقريباً.

2- Clearance resources with Israel = 60% of the total, and the equal (50–55 million) per month.

3- الدعم والمعونات العربية بحسب مؤتمر القمة العربية (55 مليون دولار) شهرياً، تحويلات الدول غير منتظمة، وأحياناً تخفض إلى (30 – 40 مليون) دولار.

3- Arab Support and aid according to the Arab Summit ($ 55 million) per month, non–regular transfers of countries which sometimes go down to (30–40 million) dollars.

4- الدعم والمعونات الخارجية، وصلت في عام 2003 إلى (654 مليون) دولار تقريباً. الدعم الأمريكي= 17% , الاتحاد الأوروبي= 13%, اليابان= 11%, النرويج= 7%, البنك الدولي=6%, هولندا وإيطاليا والسويد من (3–5%), وآخرون (22%).

4- foreign aid, reached (654 million US) dollars in 2003. US support = 17%, EU = 13%, Japan = 11%, Norway = 7%, World Bank = 6%, the Netherlands, Italy and Sweden (3–5%), others (22%).

5- جزء كبير من المساعدات يأتي من خلال البنك الدولي حيث يعتمد البنك سياسة تنفيذ وسياسة تخصيص وصرف الأموال التي تقدمها الدول المانحة.
5- Much of the aid comes through the World Bank, which is in charge of a policy of implementing, allocating and overseeing the funds provided by donor States.

Expenses:
Total = $ 2.2 billion (budget 2005).
Salaries = $ 94 million = (43%).
Current expenditures = $ 86 million.
Deficit = $ 1.16 billion.

The external support represents 60% of the money required to counter the deficit, while the remaining part is financed from borrowing. These data reveal two facts to the reader: first the harmful effects caused by the financial embargo and the halting of aid not only to the Palestinian Government and Hamas, but also to the Palestinian people, especially the working class and low-income and unemployed people. Second, the extent of national responsibility that nine outgoing Governments have failed to perform.

وفي هذا تقول (الدبلينز البريطاني) في 6/5/2006م تحت عنوان (سلطة مسؤولية منذ ولدت): "إن السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية لم توقف عن "تسول" المساعدات منذ تشيليها خلال محادثات أوسلو التي جرت أولئ التسعينات من القرن الماضي، وإن مما زاد من اعتمادية السلطة على الغير لتدريب التمويل اللازمة لها هو الفساد الذي استشرى بين عدد من مسئوليه إبان حكم حركة فتح، والذي انتهى في يناير الماضي بفوز حركة حماس في الانتخابات العامة الفلسطينية."
In this (the Daily Telegraph) says on 6/5/2006 under the title (beggar power since birth): 'The Palestinian Authority did not stop' begging "aid since it was formed as a result of the the Oslo talks in the early 1990s and whose dependence for aid increased due to the corruption that spread among a number of Fatah officials. An end to the corruption came in January when Hamas won the Palestinian general elections.

The Daily Telegraph said: "Before leaving power Fatah appointed 30,000 supporters to raise to more than 160,000 employees the number of government workers, leaving a heavy burden to Hamas, which the United States and the European Union stopped providing it with aid.

This is not the worst in the problem or in the siege. The worst however was the American veto, put by the Bush Administration on bank transfers to the Palestinian Government as Arab banks outside and inside Palestine could not carry out any remittances to the Government or its ministers without getting permission from the United States. Even Arab League and Arab regime were unable to break through the siege of bank transfers and failed to transfer the Islamic and Arab contributions to the Government. And when the pressure of the street reached record levels,
some transfers were made to the account of the Palestinian Authority President Office. Europe also adopted a policy sending humanitarian and social aid without consultation with the government and the Ministry of Finance.

These difficult questions make us ask ourselves and ask others where the problem is. Is it in the Arab system and Arab League?! Is it in America and Europe? In beggar PA?! or ,in the absence of a robust Palestinian economy ?! Is it in Hamas and its Government?…Etc. These are confusing questions , but it is interesting and even useful to give reader the answer Dr Salim El–Hoss, former Prime Minister of Lebanon provided under. Under the title "The problem of Hamas", Dr El–Hoss said,
مشكلة حماس

Document number (12)
The problem of "Hamas"

مشكلة حركة حماس أنها شاهد صارخ على فشل الدولة العظمى، الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، في سياساتها الشرق أوسطية على وجهين: فهي، من جهة، شاهد على أن الحرب على فلسطين لم تنته بانتصار إسرائيل التي تدعمها الدولة العظمى، دعماً مطلقاً، فبقي الشعوب الفلسطينية يقاومون بعد انقضاء 58 سنة على الحرب العربية الإسرائيلية الأولى في عام 1948.

Hamas problem is that it is an evident witness to the failure of superpower, the United States, in its Middle East's policy on two faces: on the one hand, it is a witness that the war in Palestine did not end with the Israeli victory which is backed by the super-power with unequivocal support. Moreover, the Palestinian people is still resisting after 58 years on Israeli Arab first war in 1948.

ベル詳細

وهي، من جهة ثانية، شاهد على أن الديمقراطية التي تبث بها الدولة العظمى أسفرت في فلسطين، عندما طُلِقت، عن فوز أعداء الدولة العبرية، ومعها الدولة العظمى.

On the other hand, it is a witness of the kind of democracy that superpower is bragging about. When it is applied in Palestine, it led up to the victory of the worst enemy of the Jewish State, along with the great country.

أعتى قوة في الشرق الأوسط، إسرائيل، لم تنتصر على شعب فلسطين الصغير فلم يستسلم للقوة الغاشمة. وعدم انتصار إسرائيل الحاسم هو في حكم الهزيمة النكراء لها للدولة العظمى التي تساندها بلا حدود. فلم يُجد إسرائيل نفعاً أقتناها أحدث ما توصلت إليه تكنولوجيا الحرب المتطرقة من أسلحة فتاكة ومدمرة، كما لم يبلد من الواقع شيئاً دعم الدولة العظمى المطلق لها

Madaًياً وعسكرياً، وإحاطتها بالغطاء السياسي والدبلوماسي والإعلامي إلى أقصى الحدود.

The mightiest force in the Middle East, Israel, did not triumph over the little people of Palestine as they did not surrender to the oppressive force. Israel's non-decisive victory is considered as a horrible defeat for it and to the superpower countries supporting it. It has not been useful for Israel to possess the latest sophisticated lethal and destructive weapons of
After more than half a century of wars, attacks and the orgies, and what happened during occupation of land, confiscation of property and the destruction of wealth, killings, harassment and displacement, the Palestinian people are still resisting, and there is not in the horizon what ends their steadfastness or resistance.

According to the Zionist perspective, the witness on this miserable reality is Hamas, along with Islamic Jihad and the Al Aqsa Brigades, and the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other factions.

The superpower raised, with flood of hypocrisy and arrogance, slogans of freedom, democracy and human rights. It falsely considered Israel as the only democratic state in the Middle East. This is an ugly description to a force practicing the ugliest colors of terrorism against the people of Palestine without scruples nor deterrent. It prepared all the peoples of the region and provoked their feelings of rejection and anger. Then the steadfast Palestinian people grabbed the call for democracy and delivered the power via free elections, to the worst enemy of Israel and of America. It was another defeat to a superpower. (Hamas) was a witness..
This is the Hamas problem: it is being the obvious witness to the defeat of the mightiest force in the Middle East backed by the greatest power in the world. How can the Hamas big sin be excused? Recently, the inability of the brute force has appeared in front of the will of small people: it was the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon without conditions, being defeated in front of the Lebanese national resistance.

It was that the Israeli abusive authority deliberately constructed a separation wall sheltering themselves from the Palestinian resistance attacks. The Israeli occupation also was forced to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza Strip and dismantle some Jewish settlements in the Arab land. Israel and America described these regressions as advances made by the Jewish State through good management, which otherwise were convincing defeats. If the aggression state had been able, it wouldn't have embarked on any of those steps.

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Israel and the super-power behind it suffered an ignominious defeat, at the time when it achieved a victory to split Arab front the Arab Republic of Egypt unilaterally signed a peace agreement at Camp David, followed a few years later with another agreement with Jordan in the Wadi Araba. Although the two Arab countries came out of the war arena with the Jewish State forever, Israel victory has not been complete as the Egyptian and Jordanian people refused to normalize relations with Israel; there are neither Egyptian or Jordanian tourists in Tel Aviv, nor Israeli tourists walking freely in Cairo and Amman streets. There are neither Israeli goods in Egypt and Jordan markets, nor Egyptian or Jordanian goods in the Israeli market.

And the word (the Israeli enemy) is still used by people and commentators in the Arab country. Here, too, the Israel uncompleted victory is considered a defeat.

There is no denial on the distinction between compromise and peace. The compromise ends war, but peace is not truly achieved without a settlement associated with the people's satisfaction: Palestinian people in particular and the Arab people in general. The Camp David agreement and the Wadi Araba accords were on the compromise level and did not live up to the peace level.

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Today Hamas, by its resilience, perseverance, struggle and resistance, and its victory in a free and fair parliamentary elections, is a lively symbol for this defeat. This is an unforgiving crime. So Israel and America are determined to punishing Hamas for what it has committed. They are even trying to snatch what is missed for them for more than half a century of abuse, orgies and even trivial and false triumphs through Hamas victory in the democratic process.

They imposed a blockade on the Palestinian Authority led by Hamas, and they prevented all support and aid to stifle it. Furthermore, they announced that they will not deal with Hamas in any way to isolate it internationally, and they also pressured on Arab States to prevent them from any steps to help Hamas.

In addition, they are demanding Hamas to recognize Israel's existence as a pre-condition to deal with the PNA. They also want Hamas to stop violence once and for all, to stop any resistance, and to recognize the agreements previously signed with Israel forcibly. In other words, they are trying to snatch from (Hamas) what they have failed to achieve over the long years of bitter conflict. I wonder, how is the recognition of a non-defined borders state?
This is Hamas problem. It is an evident witness to their defeats. They want to achieve their victory today on a foe who opposed them before. Hamas was probably the last bastion of resistance. If it accepts what is required from it, this could mean the end of the Palestinian cause. Then Syria would soon sign a forced settlement, then Lebanon will do so.

In case all ways are closed in front of Hamas, it is better, according to our perspectives, for Hamas to leave the power by a reasoned statement to the Palestinian and Arab people unveiling everything in front of the world and history, and to return to its normal position: the honorable resistance.

Thus, the problem of (Hamas) is finished by a new defeat to the Zionist project, and to the sedition project in Palestine. Arm position is the most powerful weapon which remained in the hands of Hamas at this junction. Let (Hamas) be a witness on the fallacy of West democracy!! As well as the failure of the Arab to rescue Palestine in challenging the blockade. (10/04/2006).
There are some profound reasons on the strategic vision of America, and Western and Israeli states behind their joint position to hit the Hamas project and undermine its government despite the limited geography of Gaza and the West Bank. These reasons could be summarized as follows:

- The undermining of Hamas and its government means the undermining of the Islamic form presented by Hamas, so this is a clear message to the region.

- Determining the special US position of democracy outside the United States: the US position to deal with democratic changes in the region is driven by the strong adaptation to the new winning forces with US and not vice versa.

- The success of Hamas may mean the success of the civilized project of the political Islam in the region which is a threat to the western civilization future.

- Sending a letter to Islamic countries by the West and America stating that Western powers would not accept the political Islam project as a substitute for the existing systems without a fundamental change in the ideology of political Islam.

- The success of Hamas may mean the success of the civilized project of the political Islam in the region which is a threat to the western civilization future.
The report consists of 84 pages. The part pertaining to Palestine and Syria does not exceed three pages, including recommendations No. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 in addition to introduction. One cannot make use of these recommendations if he does not read the report as a whole as the relationship between Syria and Palestine is intertwined, according to the authors' point of view, and because the recommendations refer to each other despite the specificity of the Syrian position on its relationship with Lebanon.

Recommendations introduction:
At the beginning of the recommendations there are important premises representing perspectives upon which the recommendations were built. These premises.

1. "The United Nations will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the (Arab-Israeli conflict), so there must be renewed and strong commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab peace, on all fronts, and Syria, and the commitment of President Bush in January 2002 regarding the two-State solution for Israelis and Palestinians"

This paragraph shows clearly that the United Nations is unable to establish and achieve peace in the Middle East and, so it is always in need of an active role for the United States. In other words, the task of achieving peace or settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict is formed on points; perhaps the most important point is the role played by the United States followed by that of the United Nations, the latter's role is mostly a decoration role to cover what the parties agreed upon under the auspices of
The international Organization weakness is due to the United States blocking the UN role, and the inability of the Security Council members in facing the American administration for many reasons. The most important reason is to avoid their direct interests in conflict with Washington. This requires Arab regimes and Palestinian leaders to recognize the reasons of their failure in using their vision of the Security Council and United Nations organizations regarding UN intervention to stop Israeli aggression, and in finding a fair solution for the Palestinians. So they need to search for an appropriate strategy that deals with reality and its ramifications. Researchers say the new deal should choose between either subjection to America's position or rejecting it. The latter view supports looking for alternatives, and this is not impossible.

2. "this commitment must include direct talks with Israel, Lebanon, and Palestine, (who accept the right of Israel to exist) and especially Syria, which is considered as base weapons shipment to Hezbollah, and which supports radical Palestinian groups"

* in this paragraph there are two important points after adopting the principle of direct talks between Israel, Lebanon and Syria. First: Palestinians are divided into two teams: a group which recognizes the right of Israel to exist, and that includes (PLO, and Fatah) although the leadership of Fatah rejects this accusation and insists that it did not recognize Israel, saying that the (PLO) did. America and Israel however know that there is no difference between Fatah and PLO, as Fatah represents the main part, with the leftist Palestinian factions supporting the Fatah track.
This means the other Islamic factions (Hamas and Jihad) have no connection with the US and its commitments, until they change their strategies and declare unequivocally the right of Israel to exist, and this requires from Islamic organizations to choose one of the two options: either to follow (PLO) and recognize Israel, getting involved in the settlement process and participating in the authority, or to develop a strategy that forces the USA to change its position and forget this unacceptable division. This requires accepting truce instead of recognizing Israel's right to exist.

And the second: Baker-Hamilton urge the USA to focus on Syria as it is the key to Palestinian - Lebanese front; Syria also has influence on Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad (the militant Palestinian) as they claimed. Politically, the Syrian position is also important for Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian factions. Therefore, this requires an appropriate strategy in dealing with the present and the future Palestinian and Syrian relations while putting an end to aspects of the US hegemony. Taking a lesson from what had happened to other countries in the region was also important.

3. "the United States did not support its ally, Israel, to avoid a direct entry in finding a resolution for the Arab-Israeli conflict for several reasons. The reasons, which we must deal with courage, include:
- There is no military solution to the conflict.
- The vast majority of politicians and Israelis are fed up with Israel being in a permanent state of war.
- The political and bureaucratic pressure by the US on the Arab-Israeli conflict was heavy.
- The US was not willing to act as a mediator in the peace process.
- The US was not willing to commit military forces to support Israel.
- The US was not willing to provide economic aid to Israel.

3. عالمياً، نحن نفهم أن هناك مصالح إسرائيلية في حالة حرب دائمة. 
- الحكومة العالمية من السياسيين والإسرائيليين قد ضعفت على كون إسرائيل أمة في حالة حرب دائمة.
- "لم تدعم الولايات المتحدة تحالفًا إسرائيليًا لتجنب الدخول المباشر في حل الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي وذلك لعدة أسباب، والسبب هو أن نتعامل معها بشجاعة:
- لا يوجد حل عسكري للصراع.
- الغالبية العظمى من السياسيين والإسرائيليين قد ضعفت على كون إسرائيل أمة في حالة حرب دائمة. 
- "الولايات المتحدة لا تدعم تحالفًا إسرائيليًا لتجنب الدخول المباشر في حل الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي لأنها تواجه أزمة في حالة حرب دائمة.

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Political dialogue and engagement in dialogue are essential in the Arab-Israeli conflict as the collapse of the political process will automatically lead to violence on the ground.

- The only basis on which peace can be achieved is via Security Council resolutions 242 and 338—the land for peace principle.

- A permanent peace is the output of negotiations, similar to the peace achieved between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan.

This solution will strongly support moderate Arab governments in the region, especially the democratically elected governments in both Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority under the rule of President Mahmoud Abbas.

The researchers have allocated this part of the introduction for Israel. And what we must be concerned about in this report—after giving the first part to Palestine and Syria and devoting this paragraph for Israel—are important strategic points, which require attention on the part of strategy planners. The main points are:

"This report indicates depends on Israel being involved in a direct and serious peace process." It is not in the interest of America to continue its support of Israel without having alerted Israel to the need to participate in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiations. This support may weaken or change if Washington gets a conviction that Israel is not interested in finding a solution, and is trying not to abide by its commitments. This fact is acknowledged by Israeli leaders so they cleverly try to avoid it by building a strategy on important pillars: First, self-reliance, second a search for alternatives on appropriate time.

In the American's view, this requires gathering undeniable evidence that he has achieved a major degree of cooperation with Israel in the fight against terrorism.
This American situation requires more courage from American leadership to persuade Israel not to evade from ending the conflict because it harms Israeli interests and harm the chances of continuing US support. Evidence of this can be found in the following points mentioned earlier: (absence of a military solution, and Israel’s worry of being in a permanent state of war and violence on the ground due to the absence of peace).

The peace and settlement support America’s interests, and support the interests of Israel and moderate Arab regimes, as the absence of that means the support of hardliners in the region so the researchers recommend the US administration to get involved in the peace process. This speech is useful to Washington and could be helpful to the Palestinian leadership willing to develop their own strategy to serve Palestinian interests; it's a strategy which first requires (option choice).

Does the option is a negotiated settlement based on the rules of US vision and the modifications that can take place, or does option mean rejection? This requires a strategy based on the option of rejection, taking advantage of the negative developments on the Israeli situation caused by the ongoing conflict, and the developments in the future of US-Israeli relationship on how this relation can be penetrated and halted, which needs consideration because the US policy is dealing with Arab regimes presenting themselves as an alternative to Israel in accordance with the theory of "dual containment" rules to the Arabs and Israel.

Talking about strategies usually avoids details as much as possible for several reasons, and that's what report did, and our comments on the report were similar to this vision.
After the introduction which identified important perspectives of the researchers, the recommendations came as follows:

**Recommendation 13:**
There must be renewed and strong commitment by the United States for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, on all sides: Lebanon and Syria, and commitment in March 2002 by President Bush regarding the two-states solution.  

**Recommendation 14:**
This effort should include as soon as possible an unconditional invitation to hold meetings under the auspices of the United States and the Quartet between Israel and Lebanon and Syria, and Israel and the Palestinians (who recognize the right of Israel to exist). The aim of these meetings is to negotiate for peace similar to the negotiations done in the Madrid Conference of 1991, on both separate tracks Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians.  

*we note that there is an urgent need to find a solution as soon as possible and to maintain separate tracks while excluding those who do not recognize the right of Israel to exist.*

**Recommendation 15:**
With regard to Syria, some of the negotiated peace elements include:

- Syria's commitment to Security Council resolution 1701 in August 2006 calling for Syria to help Lebanon extend full control over its territory.

- Syria should fully cooperate in investigating political murders in Lebanon, especially the assassinations of Rafik Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.
- Syria should stop supporting Hezbollah and using Syrian territory to transport weapons and Iranian support for Hezbollah (this step will help considerably in the solution of the problem with Hezbollah, Israel).

- Use Syria's influence and impact on Hamas and Hezbollah to release captured Israeli soldiers.

- proven stop for Syrian efforts to undermine the democratically elected Lebanese Government.

- proven stop to Syria regarding the transfer of weapons from Syria to Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups.

- Greater Syria's efforts to seal its border with Iraq.

Recommendation 16:
- In return for such acts, and through constant peace agreement, Israel must return the Golan Heights with US security guarantees for Israel, which may include international forces on the border involving US troops if requested by both sides.

Recommendation 17:
- Regarding the Palestinian issue, the negotiated peace elements must include:

  - A commitment to Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace, which are the only basis for peace.

  - Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to be full in control of authority, paving the way for negotiations with Israel.

  - main effort to end the current hostilities by promoting a cease-fire reached between Israel and the Palestinians in November 2006.
- Support for Palestinian national unity Government.
- Sustained negotiations, leading to a peace agreement complying with the President’s two-state solution and which may lead to the termination of the borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the right of return issues, and the end the conflict.

*In these recommendations, there are new dimensions for Palestinian national unity, in addition to building a new political consensus among Palestinians and the Arab world, which is acceptable among Arab regimes and the PN President, while Hamas reserves some main points on it, bearing in mind that Washington is considering Hamas out of the game and outside the settlement until the latter recognizes the right of Israel to exist, so contrary to the report of the Baker-Hamilton, President Bush refuses to deal with a national unity Government.

This requires from Hamas to answer the question- after our knowledge of opponent aim and enemy strategy- what is Hamas’s response? And what is its alternative strategy in specific points? And its capacity to apply it? And how it will deal with the Arab world that accepts the American vision? These questions reflected the daily practical confrontation of the Hamas government experience, the tenth Palestinian Government, while confrontation is still going on in regional and international arenas.
ERFAN Nizam Al-Din (writer and journalist) in ,the life newspaper, issued in London ,Says on 29/5/2006 may God help the new Government (Hamas) because the legacy is heavy and the conditions are difficult, if isn't be impossible ,it is not only put sticks in the wheels and laying minefields in headquarters and turns, but it extends to include implementation of the programmed plan to overthrow "Hamas " and create mechanisms designed to mislead any road map formulated by the faction to address the situation, and try to find successful solutions to the problems and difficulties that doesn't face alone, but face the Palestinian people in his identity, present and future and threat it on its basic life needs.

The threat reach to the shaky and lost national authority between the internal and external pressures and the pressures of the democratic game and the Zionist Wolf siege, swinging between fear of falling and losing an independent State dream , and withstand front the storm,by crisis management and deal wisely with the stage necessities and time awaiting for a miracle which protects the ship from sinking and breakup between choppy waives.
الانقلاب الصعب: (التطبيق):

الانقلاب الصعب: (التطبيق):

 لما أحست قيادات التيار الانقلازي أن جهودها الضخمة في خطة البقاء في الخفاء لم تحقق أهدافها، اتجهت إلى الخبراء الأخرين (الأمني العسكري) وهو الخيار الذي تفضله قيادات شابة طموحة، وتراء أقصر الطرق لتحقيق أهدافها، ولا ترى فيه خطأ كبيراً على نفسها أو على المجتمع الفلسطيني، وذلك من خلال افتتاح صدامات مسلحة مع حماس، واستدراجها إلى هذا المربع، الذي من شأنه أن يحقق لهم

هدفين مهمين:

the hard coup : (application):
when The coup leadership has felt its huge efforts on plan (stay in hiding )have not achieved their goals, it headed to the other option (military security) which is prefer by young ambitious leaders, and the shortest way to achieve their goals, does not see a serious risk to themselves or to Palestinian society, by fabricating armed clashes with Hamas, and being drawn to this area , which would achieve two important objectives:;

، الأول تشويه صورة حماس المتدينة النقية التي تؤمن بحريمه الدم الفلسطيني على المستوى الداخلي في فلسطين، وعلى المستوى الخارجي في البلاد العربية والإسلامية، من خلال التركيز على ما أسنته في الإعلام "تيار دموي في حماس" يؤمن بالقتل والخطف والإعدام، وستفقد حماس بهذا جزءاً مهماً مع شعبيتها ومصادر دعمها، وسيعمل الدم والإحساس بالخطر على توحيد تيارات فتح ورص صفوفها حول القيادات الشابة المنتظرة. The first tarnish the image of the pure religious Hamas, which believes in sanctity of Palestinian blood on the domestic level in Palestine, and externally in the Arabic and Islamic countries, focusing on what it calls on media " bloody faction on Hamas" believes in murder, kidnapping and death, Hamas will lose by this an important part of its popularity and support, blood and sense of danger will work to unify Fatah ranks around the influential young leaders.

والآ ر إضعاف قيادة الحكومة وسيطرتها على الأوضاع ودفعها إلى القبول ببرنامج أبو مازن، أو حزم حقوقها والرحيل، أو القبول بحكومة إنقاذ وطني يشكلها الرئيس أبو مازن ويتحمل هو مسؤولية فك الحصار، وإنقاذ المجتمع الفلسطيني من الأخطار التي تحيط به.

the second is weaken governments control over the situation and push it to accept Abu Mazen’s program , or packs its bags and go away , or accept national salvation government formed by president Abu Mazen and he responsible to break the siege and save Palestinian society from the dangers that surround it .
In an article in the Middle East on Sunday 16 April 2006, Bilal Hassan describes the Palestinian Government's predicament, the opinions of the rejectionist's leaders dubbed as young. He said,

"It is become clear that the first Hamas government is heading towards trouble without a way out; it received empty financial treasury, and it is unable to get their dues (customs revenues) collected by Israel and transferred into the Palestinian treasury. Furthermore, the government won't get European and US aid because their political conditions are not accepted by Hamas. It also won't get enough Arab aid even if countries have honored their obligations. It will not be able to open bank accounts in the name of authority because some countries such as America are threatening these banks for the financing of terrorism."

And when Western funds reach the Palestinian Presidency, the disbursement of these funds are conditioned not to be passed through the Palestinian Ministry. Arab or Islamic countries, intending to provide special assistance to the Palestinian Authority, are facing American pressure which prevent them from doing so.
And if the Palestinian Ministry got funds from Iran, for example, the accusation of the admission of the PNA to the axis of "rogue States" is available in advance. According to this picture, Israel had succeeded in imposing an Israeli and international siege on the first Hamas government. In addition to the economic blockade, there is a political siege in which all the parties mentioned except some Arab parties announced to boycott any political contact with the Hamas-led government.

Then comes the greatest matter presented by the Israeli war against the PA, taking the form of naval and land bombardment and air strikes on towns and villages in the Gaza Strip. (The article is so long, so we have to be satisfied with what we mentioned before related to the staying in the shadow plan. Let us move to the paragraph that discusses the second phase: military security solution. It says:

"Israel wants the collapse the Palestinian situation, and it wants to create a situation of chaos involving hunger, blockade, murder. It also wants to lead to a state of rebellion against the Hamas government and the Palestinian Presidency, the Legislative Council, and the Fatah movement. It also wants to produce one of two possibilities:

The first: to change the Palestinian people, so this change leads to a new Palestinian Authority election, which accepts the conditions of Israeli negotiations.

The second: to create a situation of chaos, involving hunger, blockade, murder, and to lead to a state of rebellion against the Hamas government and the Palestinian Presidency, the Legislative Council, and the Fatah movement. It also wants to produce one of two possibilities:

The first: to change the Palestinian people, so this change leads to a new Palestinian Authority election, which accepts the conditions of Israeli negotiations.
The second possibility: a new authority will come out of chaos and rebellion. It will control the situation even through bloody clashes to impose a new authority, at the same time will accept the solution offered by Israel as the only realistic and possible one. We do not show here possibilities of a theory. President George W. Bush has previously announced the two state vision, including his call for the Palestinians to choose a new leadership.

In that time, the campaign was directed towards the leadership of the late President Yasser Arafat, but the terms of the vision were very clear that the issue was not related to individuals but of orientations, attitudes, and what Israel inspires now is to put this American concept into practice. We cannot ignore here that the political map of Palestine in Gaza Strip includes parties who think about organizing revolution against Hamas, Fatah and all the Palestinian Authority, and it is progressing towards its goal through so-called lawlessness and assassinations of the leaders opposing them. Let us recall here the 2004 rebellion in Gaza Strip which was undermined by the late President Yasser Arafat.
Document No.16

The Palestinian infighting in the Israeli Perspective

In a statement given by the Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense "Efraim Sneh" regarding the events taking place in the Palestinian territories on 30\1\2007, and in response to a question "Is it true that we are not fighting alone? and, we should know well that there is huge effort carried out by the Preventive Security Apparatus in Gaza which is directed by Abu Mazen and his aide Mohamed Dahlan at least this night at the Islamic university?"

The minister answered" I do not think that awards of recognition should be granted publicly to others, but what these security apparatuses do now is something important for them. On the other hand, this infighting reflects the huge division between Fatah and Hamas, and there is no single unity government being able to fix this division, because it is uncompromising, reflecting the special nature of the Palestinian society.
Document No. 17
Khalid Mashaal’s speech and its repercussions
Damascus on 21\4\2006

Mr. Meshaal’s speech came less than a month after the government taking over power. The speech was a direct result of the Palestine internal situation and the external Israeli-American situation from the Hamas government, but it was like a huge blow for internal and external parties.

Although the speech was outlining the current situation involving a high degree of credibility, the problem was not just about credibility; it was about the emotional, strong-worded speech which has never been heard before by Khalid Meshaal or any other Hamas leader. The speech was delivered in a big festival held at the Yarmouk refugee camp and was broadcast by Aljazeera satellite channel to Arab and international viewers. The speech did not respond enough to the (The Stay in the Shadow Plan), which the Palestinian Centre of Media published excerpts of it. Despite the fact that Khalid Meshaal has the intelligence and the necessary political prudence, his speech gave great opportunities to the leaders of the coup to seize the event, to implement ‘The Stay in the Shadow Plan’ and to attack both the government and Hamas. There is a plan in the time, in reading consequences and in coordinating the situation, according to Hamas supporters.

The media centres belonging to Mohammed Dahlan urged people to revenge from Khaled Meshaal, the government, and the Hamas movement. They also published hundreds of
articles and delivered provocative statements to local and international media whose effects were ten times more those effects caused by the Mashaal speech. This exacerbated the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, and as a result the Legislative Council and the Palestine cabinet in the West Bank were attacked by demonstrators carrying weapons and being incited by the leaders of the coup. Moreover, the Islamic University and Al-Azhar University in Gaza witnessed clashes where stones, weapons were used and hands fighting exchanged. As a result, the Islamic University sustained huge damage, transports and ministries in Gaza and the West Bank were blocked, and the Executive Committee convened and issued a bad statement.

The speech and its repercussions have negative impacts on the fragile Palestinian front under the Hamas government. By 21 4 2006 the government had been going through incomplete steps to enhance its existence within the ministries and in the Palestinian street, experiencing internal and external obstructions that were undermining its success. This extended to the relationship between the government and President Mahmoud Abbas. In a meeting which followed this speech and brought together the prime minister and some ministers with the president together with his office manager and members of the executive committee in Gaza, Mr. Abbas showed his dissatisfaction and expressed his anger with the government and the movement. Being harsh, he rejected the Mashaal speech and the writer, holding the government accountable for the speech and its consequences, adding that he would not forgive anyone. Meanwhile, Ismail Hannia and the ministers tried to answer the queries of the president, hoping to defuse the tension but to no avail. Abbas refused the prime minister’s mediation, and the government did not participate in the reconciliation efforts played by Qatar and Yemen. The coup leaders as well as executive committee members have also participated in simplifying the problem and spoiling the relation, using claims of abuses directed at the president not on his policies. This contradicted with the speech which did not refer to any abuses made against the president.

However, the abuses were orchestrated by the president’s entourage. The speech and its repercussions have negative impacts on the fragile Palestinian front under the Hamas government. By 21 4 2006 the government had been going through incomplete steps to enhance its existence within the ministries and in the Palestinian street, experiencing internal and external obstructions that were undermining its success. This extended to the relationship between the government and President Mahmoud Abbas. In a meeting which followed this speech and brought together the prime minister and some ministers with the president together with his office manager and members of the executive committee in Gaza, Mr. Abbas showed his dissatisfaction and expressed his anger with the government and the movement. Being harsh, he rejected the Mashaal speech and the writer, holding the government accountable for the speech and its consequences, adding that he would not forgive anyone. Meanwhile, Ismail Hannia and the ministers tried to answer the queries of the president, hoping to defuse the tension but to no avail.

President Abbas rejected the reconciliatory efforts by Prime Minister Ismail Hannia, and subsequently rejected similar efforts played by Qatar and Yemen. The coup leaders as well as executive committee members have also participated in simplifying the problem and spoiling the relation, using claims of abuses directed at the president not on his policies. This contradicted with the speech which did not refer to any abuses made against the president.

However, the abuses were orchestrated by the president’s entourage.
There is no doubt that the speech was not focusing on Khalid Mashaal's character, his political policy and diplomatic tactics whether inside or outside Palestine. We and Arab did not experience him using such a language and emotions in media. A large number of well-known figures in the Islamic and Arab world have contacted the government , and many journalists have written about the speech, its consequences and causes; some of these articles were biased but the others were unbiased. The responsibility was individual, but it was not that either. It could be an individual responsibility because it is the result of cumulative frustrations that the Hamas leader felt, and it reflected the huge disappointments and failures in achieving great hopes that Khalid Mashaal and his team expected to achieve while visiting Arab and Islamic countries. The team said that the money to be collected could be a billion and two hundred thousand dollars. This means the money could be used to pay the needs of the government and the Palestinian people for a year without recourse to the American and western aids. Khalid Mashaal was confident about this number, and was sure of achieving it as he trusted the promises he received. Surprisingly, the government, which receives full support of Mashaal and which is an essential part of the Islamic project, was not functioning properly due to lack of money and the non-fulfillment of promises. Therefore, the government has stopped seeking help through telephones, letters and envoys.

On the other hand, the speech was a collective responsibility for two reasons: first, it informed Khalid Mashaal about "The stay in the Shadow Plan" and the difficult coup plan due to his first position. The second reason is the large number of messages ( by telephone, post and in-hand ) sent to Damascus complaining about the difficult circumstances of the work of the government due to the huge obstacles created by the Ninth Government, particularly in the period of the caretaker government and after the results of elections (25/1/2006). Some of these complaines were objective, accurate and documented, while others were imaginative, exaggerated, showing some degrees of conspiracy theory without taking into consideration the objective conditions for the self-rule government depending on aids; a government in which personal interests come in priority before the interests of the public.
A great number of writers and observers looked at the Meshaal speech. They found that it is not different from those in the corruption-related statements unfolded by the Fatah Attorney General, which exceeded 700 million dollars. Thus, the writers confirmed that the thugs who stormed the Legislative Council, the Health Ministry building, and the buildings of the Islamic university, are part of a broader context aimed at undermining the government of Hamas through seditions, dissemination of malicious rumors, inciting public opinion, and exaggerating events. The writers summarized these aims as follows:

1. Undermining the Hamas government and toppling it.
2- Stopping Hamas from its assigned national role, putting it in the circle of reactions.
3- Testing the decisions of the Ministry of Interior announced earlier to fight lawlessness.

The Interior Minister, Said Siam, met with dignitaries, village leaders and preachers in the Omary Mosque on Thursday 20.4.2006. The meeting aimed to bring their attention to the significance of the security plan that will put an end to lawlessness.
وثيقة رقم (18)

بيان مركزية فتح

لم تكن ردود الطيار الانقلابي على خطاب مشعل موضوعية الحجة بالحجة، والبينة بالبينة، وإنما كانت عريضة تفع في سياق آخر، ولم يكن رد اللجنة المركزية لفتح موضوعياً أيضاً بل خلط الحابل بالنابل، وكال الاتهامات، واستخدم لغة مكتوبة لا تليق بمنزلة المركزية الپتة. إنه لا أحد يمكنه وصف رد فتح العنف على خطاب مشعل، غير بيان مركزية فتح الذي صدر بتاريخ 25/4/2006م ونصه بعد حذف المقدم اختصاراً ما يلي:-

Document no. (18)

Fatah central committee's communiqué

The reaction of the Fatah rejectionists to the Meshaal speech was not objective, but was an act of thuggery. The reaction of the Fatah movement was not objective too and was totally nonsense as it was full of foul language which does not reflect the movement's position. The violent reaction of the movement to the Meshaal's speech can be seen in the movement's statement issued on 25.4.2006 AD:

فإن اللجنة المركزية (فتح) تؤكد على الاعتزاز والإعجاب بالقيادة لجماهير شعبنا وأمتنا في الوطن والشتات، وتعبيرها من خلال المسيرات الوطنية الواحدة بالاقتراف حول قيادتها الوطنية ورفضها لكل إثارات الفتنة والانقسام الوطني التي جسدت الخطاب الأخير الذي ألقاه خالد مشعل في دمشق مساء يوم الجمعة الموافق 21/4/2006. لقد توقفت اللجنة المركزية عند ما ورد في هذا الخطاب الناقص وتداعياته التي تمس المصالح العليا لأبناء شعبنا الفلسطيني ووحدته الوطنية التي تحمي بها عبر عقود متواصلة من النضال والحنكة والشجاعة، وأكدت على ما يلي:

The Fatah Central Committee showed its pride and appreciation in our people and our nation at home and in Diaspora, and their support to the national leadership through the demonstrations they carried out in this regard. The committee rejected all forms of sedition and division represented by the last speech given by Khalid Meshaal in Damascus on Friday 21\4\2006.

The central committee reviewed this indignant speech and its repercussions related to the highest interests of our people and
national unity which they have demonstrated through the long decades of struggle, cleverness, and courage. It also confirmed the following:

أولاً: لقد عبر الخطاب عن عقليته غير المؤمنة على الديمقراطية والسلوك المنظم في الأداء والوعي والأخلاق التنظيمية، وهو أمر يقود المجتمع الفلسطيني إلى الفوضى والتفسخ والإرباك.

ثانياً: لقد عبر في الخطاب عن التفكير المغلق بأنه الحقيقة المطلقة ولا أحد غيره، مما يعزز عدم وعيه لروح المسؤولية الوطنية الجماعية وروح التعددية التي امتازت بها المسيرة الوطنية عبر العقود كلها.

First: The speech revealed Meshaal's rigid mentality regarding democracy, organized performance, awareness, and regular manners, This will lead to more chaos and confusion in the Palestinian community.

Second: It expressed Meshaal's limited thinking being as the sole and absolute person, reflecting unawareness of the spirit of national responsibility and pluralism characterizing the national march through all decades.

ثالثاً: لقد عبر في خطابه عن الكمائن في القول والفعل لمخططات الإحلال التدريجي، وتنويج ذلك بنتائج العقلية الإقناعية التي سقوط العمل الوطني الفلسطيني إلى الدمار والفتنة والكوارث.

رابعاً: هذا الخطاب المموى الذي تلدذ ببكل الاتهامات الباطلة للفياديم الوطنية الفلسطينية، التي استمرت عبر العقود وواجهت العديد من المؤامرات والأخطار، وحققت حماية العمل الوطني من المساس والتردد، أكد بدون شك ضحالة الفكر والغطرسة والغرور والعبث بالنسيج الوطني والرغبة الجامحة بالتفريق ومحاولات الإرباك الوعي الوطني ونقله إلى مباهاته، وإلى مرافى الوهم والخدلانون والتبعية والوصاية والمحورية.

Third: He has expressed ill intentions and a plan for a gradual replacement. It also showed a mentality which will lead the Palestinian national work to destruction, sedition, and disasters.
Fourth: This bad speech also contains accusations to the Palestinian national leaders who, through decades, faced many conspiracies and threats and protected the national work from deformation. Undoubtedly the speech showed Meshaal’s shallow thinking, arrogance, pride and his attempts to disturb the national cohesion, leading it to delusion, dependency, and centrality.

Fifth: The gravity, which the speech reflected, is its failed attempt to spread sedition through all parts of the speech to the Palestinian national scene and his attempt to hide the failure of his policy without showing the basic rules of care and interest, given the fact that he is the head of the political bureau of Hamas. Instead it would have been better for him to inform his people of the practical and serious solutions that would secure more participation in authority, the respect of pluralism and the adoption of democracy as the only choice for the national hopes. This would also involve meeting the needs of Palestinian people, particularly their political, national and daily needs in addition to building up relationships at local, regional and international fronts, thus reassuring the Palestinian people on their future.
Sixth: By releasing this statement the Fatah Central Committee came to the conclusion that it will not follow these illusions and trivial incidents as Fatah represents the safety net of the dignity of Palestinian people in their courageous struggle to achieve national goals and establish a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Furthermore, Fatah drives its commitment and responsibilities from its policy of directing its struggle towards the occupation and maintaining the independent Palestinian decision and adopting resistance as the only policy it uses in struggle against the interim long term solutions. This policy also involves encountering a proposal of a Palestinian state with its temporary borders and Israeli practices. It also means facing decades long-term truce which will lead to annexation at the expense of the national goal represented in independence, sovereignty and freedom.
Seventh: The Central Committee of Fatah confirms the illegitimacy of any group that does not show full commitment to the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and its political program issued by the national institutions and the failure to maintain national relations and their prospects regionally and internationally. It also rejects the delusive attempts for political coup, contraction and centralization reflected in Meshaal’s speech. The speech also expressed subjectivity rather than objectivity or patriotism, and the choice of serious themes, cheap accusations and incitements.

These irresponsible acts were not only directed against the Fatah leaders but also against the interests of Palestinian people and their national forces. As soon as people listened to this speech and accusations, they turned up in all parts of the country and in the Diaspora showing their anger and rejection to all aspects of the accusations, fraud, deception, and sedition and expressing their insistence and determination on directing their struggle against the occupation while showing their full support to national leaders.
Hamas statement

However, Hamas, in its attempt to encounter this scathing criticism, delivered a speech to the Palestinian people. The speech "a statement to the people and nation", involved the following:

1- The severe criticism of the leaders of Hamas, particularly Khalid Meshaal, the head of the political bureau, is against all ethics, values, and the national unity and only serves the Zionist enemy and its agents, and corrupt people.

2- This smear campaign against Hamas will strengthen its position and hold it responsible to continue for the interest of our people to continue the program of resistance, change, and reform in spite of all pressures and obstacles.
3- We call upon wise people and intellectuals, especially from those belong to Fatah movement to intervene to stop rallies and spread of sedition and all aspects of infringement on property, public institutions, thuggery acts and all forms of terrorizing and intimidating citizens.

4- The demagogic practices used to spread sedition, incitement and fabrications of clashes will not force Hamas to practices that contradict with its values and principles. The movement however will be committed to its own principles.

5- We call upon Palestinian people to denounce and reject all the practices aimed at continuation of corruption, lawlessness, attempts of failing, incitement, siege of government, starvation of people, blackmail of people. We call for the unveiling of those responsible for corruption as this would be the most effective weapon to deter them.
6- We call upon our leaders and intellectuals to support Hamas and the elected government in their struggle to implement the program of steadfastness, resistance, and the movement's program of Change and Reform. Hamas will remain the people's movement, which is loyal to people, adhering to their rights and sanctities, caring about its national unity.

I do not want to comment here because there is a stark difference between the two parties with regards to the language and the control of their feelings.
تلقت حكومة إسماعيل هنية خطاب مشعل بمشاعر مختلطة، حيث تضمن الخطاب تصويرًا
لواقع المعاناة التي أحس بها الوزراء من الأسبوع الأول، وأطلقوا على حجم العراقي المتمدد
إفلاس الحكومة ثم إسقاطها، غير أن منهم من لم يوافق على أسلوب الخطاب ودرجة الحدة
والانفعال فيه، ومع ذلك فقد كان التوجه العام هو استياء ردة فعل من الطرف الآخر،
واحتواء الآثار السلبية للخطاب، والإفادة من النقاط الإيجابية فيه، غير أن نائب رئيس الوزراء د.
نصر الشاعر خرج على الإجماع وتصرف كعادته منفردًا معنًى في تصريح لوكالة رامتان
للأنباء في 21/4/2006م. "أن خطاب مشعل لا يعتبر عن موقف الحكومة الفلسطينية، ثم
أضاف لدينا في الحكومة متحدث رسمي، ونحن مسؤولين فقط عما يصدر ممن يمثل الحكومة".
وطالب "كل الأطراف تجاوز هذه التصريحات".

The Haniya government received Meshaal's speech with mixed feelings as the speech involved a description of the suffering experienced by the ministers on the first week in office. They were informed of the obstacles made to undermine and topple the government.
Whereas some ministers rejected the speech and the intensity and emotions associated with it, the general attitude of the ministers was to understand the reaction of the other party and to contain the negative impact of the speech, benefiting from its positive points. However, the deputy prime minister, Dr. Naser Alshaer, acting individually in a statement to the Ramttan news agency on 21/4/2006, said "Meshaal's speech does not represent the position of the Palestinian government. We have a spokesman in our government, and we are only responsible for what the spokesman said". Dr. Alshaer called on all the parties to overcome these statements.
Al-Shaer's statement was warmly received by the Fatah rejectionists as it was the first time for a minister and a deputy minister to ignore the statements made by the head of the Hamas political bureau, particularly in issues pertaining to the government. Indeed neither Dr. Naser nor the government got any benefit from criticizing Meshaal's opinions. This however, enhanced the position of the rejectionists as they found refuge in Al-Shaer's statement.

4 days after this statement, the Fatah Central Committee issued a statement full of abuse ten times more than that mentioned in the speech.
On Tuesday 18.4.2006, Jordan decided to cancel the visit of Dr. Mahmoud AlZahar, the Palestinian Foreign minister, to Amman after the Jordanian Intelligence Department claimed that they had confiscated arms smuggled into Jordan by Hamas to destabilize the kingdom and target Jordanian officials. The Jordanian security arrested the cell and its members confessed the accusations directed against them. Here, is the statement delivered by the spokesman of the Jordanian government, Mr Naser Joudeh, as published by Jordan's agency (Petra) on 18\4\2006.
The Jordanian government had always been keen to establish good relations with the new Palestinian government. Since the Palestinian elections and the sweeping victory of Hamas in the Legislation Council, the Jordanian government announced that it was waiting for the formation of the Palestinian government and watching closely its program, taking into consideration the Palestinian people's rights and their legitimate aspirations to establish their independent state on the Palestinian land. The Jordanian government's position obviously expressed the Jordanian respect to the Palestinian people's choice.
The Jordanian government congratulated the Hamas movement for the winning of the legislative elections, and sent a congratulatory letter to the Palestinian PM. The Jordanian government also showed its commitments to developing the existing relations with the PNA by working closely with the new Palestinian government, with the aim of realizing the aspirations, goals, and ambitions of the Palestinian people. Unfortunately, while the Jordanian government was showing its positive attitude towards the new government, the security services unveiled several attempts by Hamas to smuggle weapons and store them in Jordan. The weapons, which have been confiscated, included rockets, explosives, and automatic weapons.
In addition, the security services detected several activities for Hamas members in Jordan, including reconnaissance visits of key places in Amman and other cities.

The Jordanian government considers these practices as contrary to the basis of the Jordanian-Palestinian relations and with the different positive affirmations made by the new Palestinian government for not using Jordan to achieve any goals that might threaten the Jordanian security and without intervening in the internal affairs of Jordan.

The Jordanian government expresses its regret for these practices, confirming its deep relation with the Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authority. It also believes that these practices do not serve this relation nor the high interests of the Palestinian people and their cause which Jordan consider as their main political constants.

الحكومة الأردنية إذ تعتبر عن أسسها لهذه الممارسات فإنها تؤكد بشكل مطلق على عمق العلاقة مع الشعب الفلسطيني والسلطة الفلسطينية، وترى أن هذه الممارسات لا تخدم هذه العلاقة ولا تخدم المصلحة العليا للشعب الفلسطيني وقضيته التي يعتبر دعم الأردن لها من ثوابه السياسية التاريخية.

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اشتعل الإعلام المحلي والإقليمي والعالمي مع الشرارة الأولى للبنك الذي سدد الحكومة الفلسطينية وحماس، في وقت يبذل الحكومة فيه جهوداً وطنية لفق الحصار الدولي الذي ضرب عليها وعلى الشعب الفلسطيني ظلма، وترى أن الحفاظ على علاقة ود وتعاون مع مصر والأردن بوصفهما البوابتين الطبيعيتين لفلسطين في طريقها إلى العالم العربي والدولي في غاية الأهمية.
There was huge coverage of the news in local, regional, and international media. The news shocked the Palestinian government and Hamas as it came at a time when the government was trying to lift the siege imposed on the Palestinian people. The government believes that the maintaining of good relations with Egypt and Jordan is paramount as these two countries are the natural gates for Palestine to the Arab and international world.

On 19/4/2006, the minister of information of the Palestinian government, Yousef Rezqa denied all the accusations against Hamas, stressing that the Palestinian government was keen on maintaining the stability of Jordan, and rejecting any interference in its internal affairs or tampering with its security. He also confirmed that "Hamas has been keen to not interfere in the internal affairs of Jordan or any other Arab country, and today its keenness has increased, particularly after taking over the Palestinian government.

اجتمعت الحكومة الفلسطينية لهذا الشأن، وأكدت حرصها على الأردن حكومة وشعبًا، و حرصها على علاقات ودية مع الملك والحكومة الأردنية، وأن سلامة الأردن واستقراره هو سلامة واستقرار للفلسطينيين، وكلفت الحكومة رئيس الوزراء بنقل هذا الموقف إلى زميله رئيس الوزراء الأردني،
In its meeting the Palestinian government confirmed its commitment to having good relations with the King of Jordan, Jordanian people and the government, including the integrity and stability of Jordan. The Palestinian government authorized the prime minister to transfer this position to the Jordanian PM, and it thought that some parties perhaps were trying to destabilize the political scene and to intensify the siege imposed on the government and the Palestinian people after the elections. This action could push Jordan to take punitive measures against the government and its representatives.
Several press conferences have been held by the spokesman of the Jordanian government, Mr. Nasser Joudeh. He stressed on the accuracy of the information issued by the Jordanian government and its intelligence services, refusing the rejections of these accusations by Hamas. The Jordanian TV showed the seized arms and explosives in addition to video clips showing the confessions of the members of the cell. He called the head of the Palestinian Authority to send delegates for inspection. The show of the arms was made public because the Arab masses in Jordan, Palestine and in any other Arab countries did not believe the Jordanian story, pointing out that that the incident was politically motivated to justify the Jordanian position towards Hamas and its government.

ومن زاد الطين بلة، أن رئاسة السلطة وبعضها من حاشية الرئيس محمود عباس، وعناصر من فتح، حاولوا تأكيد صحة الرواية الأردنية، وتحمل حماس مسؤولية إفساد العلاقة مع الأردن الشقيق. فقد نسبت الصحاف الأردنية والفلسطيننة إلى الرئيس محمود عباس قوله:

"إنا لا نرضى ولا نقبل بأن يمس الأردن بأي سوء سواء كان كبيراً أو صغيراً فهو امتدانا وعمقنا الاستراتيجي."
What added insult to injury was the position of the Palestinian authority represented by President Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah members. They tried to believe the Jordanian story, holding Hamas responsible for deteriorating the relation with Jordan. The Jordanian and Palestinian newspapers have quoted Mahmoud Abbas as saying "We do not accept any action- whether big or small- that would affect Jordan, as Jordan is our extension and strategic depth".

He added: "What I was briefed on during my visit to Amman - from the chief of General Intelligence, Mahmoud Althahbi - was dangerous, astonishing and totally rejected. I was also briefed on more dangerous information about weapons, which I could not disclose due to its accuracy and seriousness, but I have to illustrate the accuracy of the information and its impact on Jordan and the Jordanian Palestinian relations".

وقوله: "إن ما أطلعت عليه خلال زياراتي لعمان من مدير المخابرات العامة اللواء محمود الذهبى كان خطيرًا ومذهلًا ومرفوضًا، وقد أطلعت على معلومات أخطر من الأسلحة لا استطيع الإفصاح عنها لدقتها و خطورتها، لكنني لا بد من أن أألهمها بالإضافة لتوضيح مدى دقة المعلومات وتأثيرها لا سمح اللة على الساحة الأردنية والعلاقات الأردنية الفلسطينية".

وقوله: "إن دقيقة المعلومات لدى الأشقاء في الأردن تضع المتلقي بصدمتها، فالسلاح شيء، والتخليط لأشياء أخرى تبدو أخطر شيء آخر".

نشرت شبكة CNN مساء الخميس اعتراضاً عدد من عناصر خلية حماس نقلًا عن التلفزيون الأردني، وتحدثت الشبكة عن السلاح والمنفجرات، وعن زيارة الوفد الفلسطيني الأمني برئاسة رئيس جهاز المخابرات العامة الفلسطينية طارق أبو رجب إلى الأردن وإطلاعه على القضية بكاملها، وما جاء في الخبر: "اطلع الوفد الأمني على حيويات قضية الأسلحة والمنفجرات التي هزيتها عناصر حركة حماس إلي الأردن و خزنتها في مناطق مختلفة ضمن مخطط
And he said: "The accuracy of the information provided by the Jordanian brothers shocked the receiver as 'weapons' is an issue, but planning for things that could be more dangerous is another issue".

CNN broadcast on Thursday evening confessions of a number of members of the Hamas cell, citing Jordanian TV. It also showed weapons and explosives, and the visit of the head of the Palestinian General Intelligence, Tareq Abu Rajab, to Jordan. The broadcaster added "The security delegation was briefed on the issue of weapons and the explosives smuggled and stored in different areas in Jordan with the aim of targeting key places and Jordanian officials, according to the commands of the Syria-based military leaders of the Hamas movement, as shown by Jordan's agency (Petra).
the accusations issued by the Hamas spokesmen questioning the credibility of the issue.

It is known that the Palestinian government did not receive any formal invitation to visit Jordan and to follow up the case. It could have been possible to take advantage from the visit of the foreign minister, Dr. Mahmoud AlZahar, which was on 19/4/2006, a day after arresting the cell and confiscating the weapons and informing him about the details, if there was a real intent to do so. The issue could have tackled away from media.

The one who invited the government to participate in the presidential security delegation to visit Amman was the Secretary General of the president, AlTayeb Abed AlRaheem, and he was the one who announced the government’s rejection of the visit paving the way for the media to benefit from the news.
The government's position on that day was that the movement had already been convicted, and its details unveiled to the media. The Jordanian scene had now closed to the government ministers even temporarily, and their participation in the delegation was with few benefits, technically and politically. It was better for the government to stay away from the circle of tension, stressing on the policy of non-interference by the government and the Hamas movement in the internal affair of any Arab country, especially in Jordan with the emphasis on the fraternal relationship with Jordan. The government also requested the king to close this file and transfer it from the security department to the wider political department.
A few months later, a Hamas delegation met with a delegation authorized by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and was briefed on the issue of the cell, weapons and fears of Jordan and their intelligence or doubts. The meeting reassured the Jordanian party, emphasizing that Hamas was sticking to its strategy of not interfering in the internal affairs of Jordan, showing its readiness to have excellent relations with the Kingdom and never being part of any forces that may target the Jordanian arena. Furthermore, the meeting has helped to close the file, with the hope of having future meetings that could build relations for the benefits of the two peoples, Palestine and Jordan.
العميد مدير مركز دراسات الشرق الأوسط "مسك" بتاريخ 13/5/2006م إسهاماً منه ومن المركز في تعزيز العلاقات الأردنية الفلسطينية وبالذات مع حماس، وقد جاء تحت عنوان The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is a strategic relation, and the strategic dimensions of the crisis between the Jordanian government and the Hamas movement that erupted publicly on 18/4/2006 requires quiet processing based on the strategic vision of the fraternal Jordanian-Palestinian relations, especially since Hamas represents the majority in the Palestinian parliament, and is leading the Palestinian government. According to the strategic relation between the two countries, we believe that it is useful to provide the Palestinian reader with a study issued by Mr. Jawad Al-Hamad, the director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies "Misc" on 13/5/2006. The study aimed at promoting the Jordanian-Palestinian relations, particularly with Hamas. It came under the title:
The strategic dimensions of the crisis between Hamas and the Jordanian government

The Palestinian-Jordan relationships are considered one of the basic determinants of the future of the Palestinian issue and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Therefore, the security and political approaches to discussing this relation or dealing with its jargons has special sensitivity in its strategic dimension. As a result, this makes the framework for any positive, or negative developments and any approach to dealing with this relation basically stems from the strategic dimension.

These relationships have come through critical junctures in the past four decades. Despite the seriousness of some problems that arose from the actions of either party, the two parties quickly maintained the relationships due to the growing recognition of the strategy of this relation between them.

With regards to the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in freedom, independence and the establishment of their independent state, Jordan has looked very carefully into any developments in this respect due to its essential impact on the
Jordanian social and political structure of Jordan on one hand and its implications on the regional and national role on the other hand.

According to this strategic vision, the security crisis that took place three weeks ago between Hamas and Jordan was a sensitive indicator on the future of relationship between the two parties, especially as it came after Hamas's victory in the legislative elections leading it to power in the Palestinian Authority. Thus, the Jordanian policy found itself in front of a major change in the Palestinian arena which directly affected the balance of power that have existed through the past four decades. Certainly, and according to the strategic thinking, this transformation has received special attention from the Jordanian government, especially because this transformation has direct impact on the political internal situation in Jordan as well as its implications on the peace process and the high Jordanian interests.

Although Hamas has a high discipline -according to many experts in the area- in dealing with the Arab countries according to historical
experiences on one hand and its policies on the other hand, nevertheless Jordan has the right to express its concerns about the nature of changes within the next four years in the area under the Hamas-led Palestinian government.
It seems that Hamas has felt these concerns, and tried to contain them by sending reassurances letters to Jordan confirming its rejection for the Alterative Home and its insistence on the Right of Return for Refugees and its commitment to integrating with both Jordan and Egypt as a replacement for economic and political relations with Israel. This position was clearly expressed by the head of the Hamas political bureau, Khalid Meshaal since the first week of its victory, and earlier by the Palestinian Prime Minister and his Foreign minister when the government was formed. This is what some experts considered a strategic opportunity to delineate Palestinian-Jordanian relationships based on the mutual interests away from hidden agendas or interference from other parties as was the situation in the previous decades, particularly after the sudden signing of the Oslo accords in 1993. Certainly, the special relationship between Hamas and the Islamic movement in Jordan is playing an essential role in the formation of such trends, given the basic role played by Islamic movement in the social and political stability in Jordan.
In a relative respect, the Hamas announcement - government and movement and in the light of the new situation of the legitimacy of resistance against the Israeli occupation and its reservation to the previous agreements signed with Israel, and its refusal to recognize Israel has opened the door for American, Israeli, and European pressures against the movement, including the suspension of financial aid and imposing economic and political siege on the Palestinian people in order to push them to revolutionize against the new government or to force the government to respond to the international dictations.

In spite of the huge efforts exerted by Hamas before the formation of the government, regionally and internationally, the results of the American-Israeli pressures on the Arab countries varied. The Arab governments called upon Hamas to adopt the 2002 Arab initiative in Beirut, calling for the end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hamas showed its reservation regarding the recognition and the Arab normalization with Israel after its withdrawal from the lands it occupied in 1967.

وأعمال الأدنى من الدول الأولى التي تم ترتيب زيارة وقد حمس إليها، غير أن الموقف الأدنى كان يفضل الانتظار إلى حين اتصال برامج الحكومة الجديدة حسبما أعلن وزير الخارجية الأدنى، إضافة إلى إشكالات قبل أنها قانونية تنطلق برئيسي المكتب السياسي أدنى الجنسية، وبعد أن تشكلت الحكومة الفلسطينية تم ترتيب زيارة وزير خارجية السلطة الفلسطينية الجديد محمود الزهار إلى عمان يوم الأربعاء 19/4/2006، ولكن إعلان الأدنى وشكل مقايي مساء الثلاثاء 18/4/2006 عن اكتشاف عملية تهريب أسلحة إلى أراضيه من قبل عناصر
Jordan was one of the first countries to arrange for a visit by the Hamas delegation but the Jordanian situation preferred to wait until the program of the new government became clear, according to the Jordanian foreign minister. There were also some problems pertaining to the head of the Jordanian political bureau, who has a Jordanian nationality. The visit to Amman by the foreign minister, Mahmoud AlZahar, was due on April 19, 2006, but the sudden announcement of Jordan of arresting a Hamas cell trying to smuggle weapons to Jordan to carry out sabotage inside Jordan has led the Jordanian government to postpone the visit.
The unexpected announcement pushed Hamas to refute the official Jordanian statement, especially those accusations relating to targeting Jordanian people, security department, or institutions. This was against the strategy used by Hamas which was based on the non-interference in any internal affairs of Arab countries, especially Jordan according to what its leaders had stressed in many occasions. The movement did not resort to this method with any Arab country even after Jordan arrested the head of its political bureau and the members in 1999 and then deported them out of Jordan. Thus, how could Hamas be involved in such policies while it was in great need for stable Arab relations, especially with Jordan, with the international and Israeli siege being imposed on its government? This was the position of the majority of experts in the Palestinian – Jordanian relationships.

Of course, the discussion through media has exacerbated the crisis, increasing its repercussions. This was due to the parties' lack of mechanisms and effective communication channels, according to close sources who asserted that the issue could have been discussed in more further detail.

من جهة ثانية فإن غموض خلفية هذه الأزمة سياسيا من قبل الطرفين (أي انه لا مصلحة لأي منهما فيها) دفع الكثيرين للشك بتدخل طرف ثالث برجح أن يكون الطرف الإسرائيلي، والذي اعتمد على التخطيط للوقوع بين الأطراف الفلسطينية ذاتها وبينها وبين الدول العربية، والتي كان آخر محاولاتها التصورات التي أدلت بها شخصيات أمنية وعسكرية إسرائيلية لتخويف الأردن من تداعيات فوز حركة حماس وقيادتها للسلطة الفلسطينية، هذا إضافة إلى أطراف أخرى في المنطقة قد تكون معنهية بإشارة الأزمات في وجه الحكومة الجديدة من جهة، ومعنیة بوقف نجاحات حماس في بناء علاقات عربية-فلسطينية جديدة لتحقيق الاستقرار العام وخاصة مع الأردن من جهة أخرى، أخذًا بعين الاعتبار المعلومات المتداولة بين أوساط الإعلاميين عن
Meanwhile, the opacity of this crisis (i.e., none of them has interests in it) led many to doubt the intervention of a third party which is likely to be the Israeli side. The Israeli side is used to driving a wedge between the Palestinian parties on one side and between Palestinians and the Arab countries on the other. This was clearly seen in the statements made by Israel security and military officials who raise the worries of Jordan after the victory of Hamas and its leadership of the Palestinian Authority.

This also includes other parties in the region who might be involved in fomenting the crisis for the new government on one hand, and for the cessation of the successes of Hamas in building Arab-Palestinian relations to achieve general stability especially with Jordan on the other hand. This added to the information circulated in media regarding a group of people who presented their opinion 'Estimation of a position' to the United States and Israel urging them to impose siege on the new government in an attempt to topple it within three months.

The rejection of both parties to meet face to face has exacerbated the crisis. The escalation reached its peak when scenes of confessions by the cell members alleging that they were working for Hamas were shown on TV, in addition to the weapons said to be smuggled into Jordan to carry out acts against Jordanian targets under the guidance of members of Hamas.

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Away from the media mudslinging that put the relationship in jeopardy and provided an opportunity for some people to widen the gap between the two parties, - which prudent diplomacy usually try to avoid- the crisis experienced by the Jordanian-Palestinian relations centered on two issues: the first was regarding Hamas, which became the actual leader of the Palestinian struggle and the Palestinian politics and was governing the coming political period, and the second was represented by the president who is not authorized by the Palestinian statute for more political powers, and whose political situation is in harmony with the general Arab situation more than the positions of Hamas regarding the political compromise and the peace process.

Therefore, the bet of some people and their insistence on considering the PA president as the center of the relation has created an ambiguous situation as the president is not the party who has the right to build this relation, politically and constitutionally. And what has been left for him as executive responsibilities in the PLO may not last, given the new calls to reconstruct the Palestinian institution. Once this happens Hamas is expected to get huge powers which will enable it to be the basic determinant of the Palestinian strategy within the coming four years, including the form and the content of the Palestinian-Jordanian relations.

ومن هنا فإن الواقعية تقتضي التعامل مع مفردات السياسة الفلسطينية الجديدة كما هي. واحترام ما تنتجه مؤسساتها الدستورية من سياسات وتوجهات، ومن جهة أخرى فإن استمرار حركة حماس في تبني خيار المقاومة ضد الاحتلال (والذي يحظى بشعبية كبيرة في الأوساط الأردنية)
Hence, realism requires dealing with the jargons of the new Palestinian politics and respect of the products - policies and trends- of its constitutional institutions. On the other hand, the choice of resistance (which has a great popularity among the Palestinian and Jordanian circles in particular) adopted by Hamas will help the movement play an important role in the region and the middle east politics, making it difficult for the international community or Israel or any powerful country to surpass it.

This political strategy encouraged to close the crisis file and to start a serious negotiation search between the two parties (the Jordanian government and Hamas) about the nature of the crisis, and to contain its repercussions through direct, objective dialogues as this approach was the most successful way to solve the problem.
escalation, which in turn requires a reduction in local, regional and international intervention of both sides in drawing this relationship as some of those parties may have interest in deteriorating this relation.

Seeking for the formation of a high permanent commission to deal with the relations between the two parties to achieve their high mutual interests and to stop any crisis or fears of any party is important as this lays the foundation for a new era in the relations between Jordan and Palestine. It may also establish new rules to resolve the conflict with the Israeli occupation, where the two parties join the political arena united in their goals and means.

There still remains an essential question: Can the two parties stay apart from intervening parties involved in the exacerbation of the crisis? Can they keep under control the statements issued by media and security apparatuses of both parties? Can they defuse any crisis that may be caused by a third party or any minor incident that affects both parties in the future? Initial data and political readings confirm that the opportunity is there to achieve that, but when will the opportunity present itself? (Al Distoor, 15 of May 2006. Mr. Jawad Al-Hamad).
The first and the second months of the 10th government's period were full of local and international events issued by a scheme that may be mutual and aimed at undermining Hamas and toppling it after defaming Hamas and its program, and its ability to lead to the Palestinian people and to achieve the national reconciliation.

The documents, which we have mentioned some of them and what we did not mention their reasons, revealed a general context extending an organizer who has a by intrigued between the inside and the outside goal and attracts the events and the developments toward him. In the partners' conviction, the toppling of the government will not be exceed June 2006. In addition, the partners will be happier when the government is toppled as a result of popular revolution against and under the control of siege, financial and social pressures, and internal conflict.

The Palestinian people were more aware of the Islamic movement's leadership and the believers in democracy more than a group of critics of the government and the democratic process. The Palestinians and their government endured the siege, faced many obstacles, rejected the external and internal schemes, endured pains, gave the government an
opportunity for challenge and existence, and demanded the other factions to be united in facing the crisis and lifting the siege.

Thus, this convinced the leaders of detainees in the Hadreem prison to issue what is called (the prisoner's documents for the national consensus) confirming that it is a framework project approved by the prisoners to restore the campaign of the people and the unity of the national high affiliations to achieve a political and resistance programs serving interest of the Palestinian people.

The national reconciliation document is the edited version of the prisoner's document issued by the leaders of the prisoners in the Hadreem prison and signed by Marwan AlBarghoothi on behalf of Fatah, abd Abed AlKhaleq Al-Tanshaa on behalf of Hamas and Basam AlSaadi in behalf of the Islamic Jehad. It aimed at finding a solution of the political program and resistance allowing the of ending of the crisis and the conflict caused by the Fatah leaders who rejected the results of the elections, the democracy and its basic entitlements such as peaceful transfer of power.

The social rank in Palestine was threatened by aggressive conflicts, and the fledgling democracy was struggling the attempts of abortion and replacement. This prompted many people caring about the public to search for an exit to the crisis. Thus, the private economic sector and
some independents were the pioneers to develop a special initiative on presidency, Fatah on one hand, and the government and Hamas on the other hand. They called it (The private sector plan for Palestine).

The media and political circles paid attention to the private sector initiative which was chaired by the prominent businessman, Moneeb Al-Masri. However, this initiative has been stopped and received less attention after the appearance of the prisoner’s initiative in media as it received considerable attention locally and regionally. Thus, President, Mahmoud Abass, looked at as an exit from the crisis as it involved important points from the political program which he adopts and seeks to apply. Dr. Aziz Dweik, the speaker of the Legislative Council, has called for a national dialogue to face the crisis and overcome it.

President, Mahmoud Abbas, received the invitation of the dialogue, the documents of the prisoners, and he held the opening sessions of the national dialogue conference in Rashad AlShawa hall in Gaza on 25/4/2006. He announced the beginning of conference and his complete approval on everything mentioned in the document of detainees. He called on the other parties, and the government to accept, gesturing that he would resort to a public referendum if the document is rejected by Hamas or the government.

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The office of President Mahmoud Abbas, the executive committee, and leaders from Fatah have prepared well for the opening session of the national dialogue which involved the talks of the president, Mahmoud Abbas, the speaker of the legislative council Dr. Aziz Dweik, and the Prime Minister, Ismail Hanya and the leaders of other factions in addition to the Palestinian woman. The speakers, excluding Ismail Hanya and Aziz Dewik, have been able to transfer the opening session to a festival of condemnation for the government and to Hamas and its program. This happened despite the fact that the invitation of the dialogue has been initiated by Hamas represented by head of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Dr. Aziz Dweik, so this caused suspicion in the document and its goal.

The authority of the conference (Fatah and the Faction of PLO) distributed collection of papers and factions. The most important were:

1. The document of declaration of independence.
2. The document of Cairo Declaration.
3. The initiative of the prisoner's document.
4. The initiative of the Palestinian private sector.
5. The initiative of the Democratic Front for the liberation of Palestine.
6. The initiative of the Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine.
7. The initiative of people's party.

The presidency and pro-government forces have prepared well for this matter; their choices were clear, their goals were specific, and their mechanisms of work were almost ready. The factions have prepared their statements well, and distributed papers about its political perspectives to the audience. However, Hamas has been absent not only in preparation,
in papers, and in mutual coordination between leaders, but also in attendance as the majority was from Fatah movement, the left, the loyalists who supported every word about the condemnation of Hamas and its government.

The opening session and the other dialogue sessions unveiled the points of weakness in the performance of the government, the Legislative Council, and Hamas in dealing with the event and facing the preparation of others. As a matter of consideration to the points of weakness, we mentioned the following:

1- The president of the Legislative Council called for the national dialogue without coordination with the government or with Hamas.

2- The invitation's goal was not specific or clear as it did not present any work sheet either from the legislative council or the government and Hamas, so this lead to vacuum filled by others.

3- The Legislative Council did not involve in the preparation for the dialogue or determine its time, papers, the audience and depended completely on the presidency to do so according to its agenda. Thus, the presidency invited what it wanted and ignored the others, so the opening session Hamas saw less Hamas representatives as it has only one representative among the 18 representatives in the dialogue committee.

4- Ahmed Prime Minister the ministers who held it some ministers of the cabinet, of the national interest, of the interest of the committee, and the committee of the study, or a
4- The Prime minister ignored the advice given to him by some ministers to pay more attention to the national dialogue, the private sector issue, the prisoner's issue, and the formation of steering committee or holding a cabinet to stud these issues. But the PM did not pay attention to all this. So the government and the movement came a state of chaos and panic.

5- Hamas leadership was not aware of the dialogue issue, its ramifications, impacts, and the presidency and Fatah's plan to benefit from it. Hamas had not done any active communication with the leaders of the West Bank. It was exposed later that there is conspicuous gap between Gaza and the West Bank, and when the event happened, the leaders became aware of it according to the condition of reaction not the creation of the incident.

The opening session and the following sessions were a political and media shock to the program of the government and Hamas. So nothing got us out of it except the goodness of Allah, then the Jihadist inheritance and the popular support for Hamas. This is followed by the implementing of a plan to amend this situation.

CIA
In front of the bitter attack against the government and Hamas, and in front of the absence of proper preparation for the event which we were invited to attend by Aziz Dweik, the tendency in the movement was to withdraw from the dialogue sessions as one of the speakers rejected all the details of the prisoner's document because it was written by CIA, according to his opinion.

Another representative claimed that Marwan Al-Barghothi lured the prisoners in the Hadreem prison to sign the document, and they did it under the pressure of the prisons, the exploding situation in Gaza and West Bank, and the siege imposed on all Palestinians. Then, the document was issued in the prison and delivered by one person to another in front of the prison's authority which threw suspicion on its idea and content. Others said we had to withdraw from the dialogue and its sessions, and would not return until the siege was lifted and the funds were available in Ministry of Finance, because who debated with us, participated in the siege. There were differences in the opinions, and some of them were emotional and severe. The prime minister was one of the opponents of the dialogue and the document and continuing the dialogue depended on the lifting of the siege and having the funds first, but after a while he will become the larger supporter of the continuation of the dialogue and the most flexible in dealing with the alternative contexts.

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There was a group of interlocutors who believe in the necessity of dealing with prisoner's document by modification and offering alternatives, and with the resuming of the dialogue provided that the sessions being transferred to Gaza in order to prevent the objective weakness in the West Bank and its causes. I was the only one who presented a paper of modification on the prisoner's document as this paper became a basis to the internal dialogue. Thus, some people added an idea or deleted other ideas from it, and we shared this with our people in West Bank and a broad . Together with legal consultations from people inside and outside Palestine the document was adapted to be working with.

The Hamas paper with some modifications was the basis that all participating parties agreed upon. The final version of the document was signed by the president, the government and all factions to be serving as one of the most important national documents to be used by the government and the factions. It significance was similar to other documents, including the Independence Declaration Document, the National Council Resolutions, the Arab Summits resolutions, and the resolutions of the international legitimacy.

The results of the declaration of the consensus on the amended prisoner's document, which is later called " the national reconciliation document", were positive and useful for all parties ,especially Hams and Fatah. At least it ended the idea of referendum which could have undermined the Palestinian society and its social ranks, two things that some observers who were concerned with the internal Palestinian situation have warned against.
The referendum was part of a wider and more comprehensive policy aimed at revolutionizing against the government, then the Legislative council and the elections results. Alternatively, it would force Hamas and its government to deal with the president's program, to accept the quartet conditions and to abide by the agreements signed with Israel. Moreover, this will mean getting 25% of Hamas supporters' backing to the Fatah movement in the early elections, which is seen as another part of the wider and more comprehensive policy of the coup camp.

I thought that the prisoner's document is not a target itself even if it is approved by Hamas without modifications as it involved essential points rejected by President Mahmoud Abbas and Israel. I was assured by some sources that it is a target against others as it is one of Fatah's intentions to return to power or to domesticate Hamas so that it falls victim in the traps of governance. Official and media Israeli resources have rejected the document and refused dealing with it. Therefore, I decided to deal with the document with quiet diplomacy which decreases its impact, respond to the supporter's attacks, and modify its content in order to benefit from the positions of the Islamic Jihadist and the Popular Front regarding the document. So the document will become less contradictory with the Hamas and government's program. By doing this, we will put an end to all actions planned to topple the government's program or domesticate it.
But what was hurting and annoying in this matter was that the leaders of
the movement in West Bank and in the Legislative Council were ready to
accept the prisoner's document without any modifications. They
transferred their points of view to other leaders in the presidency at a
time when the leaders in Gaza and abroad have shown their rejection to
this document unless significant modifications are made. These changes
give Hamas reasonable justifications to persuade its leaders and the
opponents of the document at the beginning.

Both the government and the movement have decided to accept a
modified document which does not contradict with the position of Hamas
and other factions' programs. However, Dr. Aziz Dweik, who was not
informed of the mechanisms, preempted the incidents and presented the
modified document to the president Mahmoud Abbas as his own paper
and not Hamas’. On the other hand, the president and Fatah movement
they rejected the paper saying that it belongs to Hamas. Therefore, we
embarked on a new crisis in dialogue until we agreed upon the acceptable
form of the document which was signed by all of us as we mentioned
previously.
Everyone overcame the crisis and they learned several useful lessons from it. Today, the document became part of the mandate’s speech to form a national unity government. However, the consensus on the document was not the end of the way of obstacles in front of the government, the legislative council and Hamas. After few weeks, the leaders of Fatah Movement announced that Hamas needed a political program in which the national reconciliation document becomes one of its sources, so this confirmed our guesses that the document is considered for some of them as part of (staying in the shadow plan), especially when they wanted to invest the status and the document of the prisoners. Israel did not pay attention to the document and will not allow it to be a beginning for lifting the siege or being an entrance for a national Palestinian consensus.

The document has been placed in the Palestinian archive as an internal document which manages the internal situations but does not relate to the region and the world. However, it involved points of similarity between Hamas and Fatah movement's programs in many ways. The expectations of success of the document was higher than the expectations of Oslo, Abu Mazen program, and conditions of the quartet. This is despite the fact that President, Abu Mazen, considered it as an important development in his gradual plan to reform the ideology of Hamas or to divide it into moderates and extremists, military people and politicians, inside and outside according to some followers.
According to what was mentioned in the mandate's speech on 21\6\2006, there was a clear statement that the government should commit to a set of political documents issued by Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), or to the Arab summits. According to the overall development in the first month of the formation of the government, and the prisoner's document, which occupied the Palestinian internal arena and the media centers, I saw that it is useful to set an academic independent vision which look into the document away from the conflict.
Document No.23 The Press Asks:

Under the title "why does Mahmoud Abbas adopt the Prisoners document, and why does Hamas show reservation"? Yasser Al-Zaatra wrote in Al-Hayat- London based Newspaper on 13 May, 2006. He said, "As for Fatah, the text comes consistent with its general vision; if it does not; they would reject the document. When a person reads the articles of the document, he/she will be dazzled by Abbas' enthusiasm for this document because it is against his speech, especially the one related to the rejection of militarism. The document insists on resistance with all its means and persists on forming a unity front; it doesn't refer to the Road Map which the president always is always speaking about; Instead, it focuses on the right of return that he made concessions about it.

The most important part of the document is the reformation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization before the end of 2006, with Ahmad Qarabat's vision of the liberation front. This means Hamas and the Islamic Jihad will get about half of the seats of the parliament, which will enable them to have a veto against any resolution that contradicts with its program. This is totally rejected by Fatah. In fact, the prisoners' issue was a controversial one as the document talked about their liberation in all means not only in negotiation. In this way, the document contradicted with the way that the Palestinian authority
followed (to be more explicit, the group that made the coup against Arafat led by Dahalan). Al-Zaatra inquired about the reason behind their adherence to the document saying:

"To answer this question, we should follow the way that Arafat followed with the Palestinian factions to lure concessions from the Palestinian National Council,

When a discussion flares up and the opposition has the majority votes, a new text is intended to be issued involving the concessions he wants provided that it contains the conditions that totally restricts him. He takes the text that satisfies him and kick out other conditions. It is a matter repeated in each session of the National Council concerning the new concession. It is clear that Fatah wants to play this game with Hamas since it gives Hamas all what it wants related to the resistance, PLO and the unity government, and what Hamas must do is to give the approval on "the Arab legitimacy, international legitimacy" i.e. changing the whole political discourse and accepting what Fatah has agreed on before".
The beginning of a new chapter

In September 2006 and at the beginning of October of the same year, the pain resulting from severe internal and external pressures has reached its maximum range, in addition to the growth of a desire of the movement’s leaders and its bases for determining a new clear position to the government and the movement of the overall cumulative case through the previous months. Thus, there is no more place for more patience or containment, so several meetings and internal dialogues came to the conclusion that the Prime minister has to talk to a big a gathering at Al-Yarmouk stadium in Gaza to clarify everything concerning to the obstacles, constrains and pressures made by the president, the parallel government, and rejectionist movement.

On October 6, 2006, the exhausted Prime minister addressed the masses and the world via Al-Jazeera with all of his internal accumulations of the previous six months starting from the 1st of April of the year. The speech was long, extended, strong, emotional, frank, and scathing, and it was a declaration of the end of a phase and a method of dealing, and the beginning of other different ones.

The crowds surpassed all the expectations as their number exceeded a quarter million people, but some newspapers estimated the number was more than that. The crowds were so emotional by what they heard since the speech was delivered with special openness beyond the frame of diplomacy and compliments. Moreover, the crowds did not feel the length of time and intensity of sun heat because the content of the speech made them forget about the fatigue and heat of weather. We mention here that the prime minister did not feel well at the beginning of the speech.
Local and regional reactions varied about the speech, and many important newspapers wrote about it and some of these reactions supported the speech. One of those who accepted the speech was the Minister of Information, Dr. Yousef Rezqa, who wrote under the title:

وثيقة رقم (25)
الرئيس هنية في 6 أكتوبر يعبر حاجز الصمت

في 6 تشرين أول/أكتوبر 1973 العاشر من رمضان عبر الجيش المصري السويس واقتحم خط بارليف على وقع تكبير الجنود الصائمين، وفي السادس من تشرين أول/أكتوبر 2006 وفي النصف من رمضان اقتحم الرئيس هنية حاجز التردد في مصارعة الشعب ببعض الحقيقة التي يختزنها في نفسه على مدى سبعة أشهر من المعاناة.

Document nom. (25)
PM on 6th of October broke silence

On October 6, 1973, the 10th of Ramadan, the Egyptian soldiers crossed the Suez canal, and stormed the Bar Lev line with takbeers (jubilations) of the fasting soldiers. On October 6, 2006 in the second half of Ramdan, PM Hanya broke silence and spoke to his people about some of the truth he had been keeping inside him over the seven months of suffering.

The weather was hot and it was unusually blazing in such a month of the year, and the supporters of the Islamic project filled the arenas of Al-Yarmouk Stadium. Moreover, ten times of this number were watching the speech through Al-Jazeera Live and Al-Jazeera news.
The weather was hot, the feeling were emotional and the hope and pain were portrayed on the faces of the audience. The determinations were stronger than the obstacles, and depending on Allah blessed the places and people and were included in the chants (god's satisfaction is our goal. It's for god, it's for god, not for authority or honor). The truth is clarified among these hot atmospheres.

The speech was comprehensive and was not the last one, but it was like a shot to warn that Hamas had its right to take over the government according to the three legitimacies: the Jihadist, the electoral, the constitutional). Here it is worth making a quick review to the titles of the comprehensive speech.

- **He rejected the external interventions and others.**
  - **He rejected the policy of axes.**
  - **He emphasized the legitimacy of Hamas movement.**
  - **He stressed the Arab and Islamic depth of the Palestinian issue.**
  - **He stressed the Palestinian people's constants according to the Islamic vision, the most important of which is the non-recognition of the legitimacy of the occupation.**
  - **He confirmed the importance of political solutions to the prisoner's problem.**
  - **Offering a truce in return of withdrawal.**

وكان الخطاب شاملًا، ولم يكن الطلقة الأخيرة، وإنما طلقة التحذير والتنبيه إلى حق "حماس" في الحكم بمنطق الشرعيات الثلاثة (الجihadية، والانتخابية، والدستورية) وهنا يجد إجراء جرد سريع لعناوين الخطاب الشامل.

• رفض التدخلات الخارجية وغيرها.
  - He rejected the external interventions and others.
  - He rejected the policy of axes.
  - He emphasized the legitimacy of Hamas movement.
  - He stressed the Arab and Islamic depth of the Palestinian issue.
  - He stressed the Palestinian people's constants according to the Islamic vision, the most important of which is the non-recognition of the legitimacy of the occupation.
  - He confirmed the importance of political solutions to the prisoner's problem.
  - Offering a truce in return of withdrawal.

وعلى مستوى الجبهة الداخلية:
At the internal front:
• He called for the resumption of dialogue on the formation of a national unity government from the point where it ended and on the basis of the national reconciliation document.
• He called for a comprehensive social reconciliation.
• He called for the punishment of the perpetrators of the crimes of assassination.
• He called for the control of the security situation and prevention of crime and insurgency.

At the financial and economic fronts:
• He described the blockade as immoral and inhuman.
• He described the American democracy with 'falseness' and 'hypocrisy'.
• He called for an Arab effort to lift the siege.
• He called on Arab leaders to bear their responsibilities.
• He thanked scholars and Arab and Islamic peoples.

وعلاب على الإضراب المفتوح ووصفه بأنه سياسي وليس مهنياً وأنه استنفد أغراضاً وأنه أضر بمصالح المواطنين، وأنه يستمر تحت تهديد السلاح وليس بالاختيار واستكر ببيانات التحريض والتجريج وحرق المؤسسات الحكومية، والخاصة والتابعة لحركة "حماس"، وعدد بعض إنجازات
As for the open strike he described it as political rather than professional as it harmed the citizens' interests and it continued under the threat of weapons not as optional strike. He denounced all forms of incitement, and setting fire to government and private institutions and those belonging to Hamas. He referred to the governments' achievements on political, administrative, financial, social fronts including combating the corruption and rationalizing consumption.

What he had said was more than what we mentioned here, and it is more comprehensive and wider than those few titles. What the prime minister did not say however was more than what he said because he believes in democracy, and in the ethics of diplomatic work, and he sets the scene for the real practice of democracy. This however did not gain the respect of rejectionists who were looking for the toppling of the government.

The only way out of the siege crisis was dialogue. The successful dialogue depends on a strong internal front based, after depending on Allah, on the pure intention and the national reconciliation document signed by the majority of factions, and which the government and the presidency have abided by.

This requires stopping the media propaganda made by the media spokesmen who used media channels to bitterly attack the government on
the hope that by doing so they were building their country, lifting the siege, coming closer to the liberation of Jerusalem, returning the refugees, and removing settlements. However, they are away from goals as they occupied achieving their and unachievable goals. They also incited on the government by offering additional temptations to the outside world to continue their siege on the Palestinian government, while President Carter was taking about the failure of starvation and siege policy, calling on the U.S and the West to change their failed policy.

It should be noted that there had been several responses to the article from several writers who did not side with the positions of the government and Hamas. For example, Omar Helmy Al-Goul wrote in Al-Hayat newspaper under the title: Oh Minister of Information, Where is the Bar Lev Line?; Dr. Yousef Al-Qazaz wrote in Al-Hayat under the title: Not only the Suez Channel, and Basem Abu Somia wrote under the title: the Yaralesh Line!!

Although the varied responses included some degrees of honesty, they showed that the speech and the article received positive impact in favor of the government and the movement. This led to negative responses by Hamas rivals. Some of these responses were uttered by PNA officials including:

- د.نبيل شعت: خطاب هنية لا يليق برئيس الوزراء.
- محمد اللحام: إنه بمثابة صب الزيت على النار.
- بسام زكارنة: يستهجن تصريحات هنية.
- Dr. Nabil Shaath: Haniyeh's speech does not fit a Prime Minister.

- Mohammed Al-Laham: It is like adding insult to injury.

- Bassam Zakarneh: condemns Haniyeh's statement.

- Maher Miqdad: Haniyeh's speech was disappointing and full of fallacies, and he was like a spokesman for Hamas.

- Nabil Amr: Haniyeh's speech did not contain any new statements and did not answer any of the major questions.

- Israel: Haniyeh's suggestion about a truce was "silly".

- Dr. Jamal Nazzal: Haniyeh's speech was factional, and inviting Abbas to visit Gaza through the media was inappropriate.

- Jamal Zaqout: Haniyeh's speech was emotional, and did not offer a way out of the current crisis.

- Shaat: We are ready in Fatah to meet Haniyeh to form a national unity government.